Petitioner attorney was ordered to show cause why the court's order admitting him to practice should not be revoked for the commission of acts involving moral turpitude before his admission to practice. Following evidentiary hearings, both the local committee and respondent Board of Governors of the State Bar (California) determined that the evidence against petitioner sustained the charge against him.

Respondent Board of Governors of the Statе Bar determined that еvidence sustained the charge that petitioner employer defense attorney committed acts involving moral turpitude before his admission to practice law in California. Respondent found that petitioner knowingly made false representations regarding expenses to 11 New York law firms with the intent to deceive the firms and thereby obtained money to which he was not entitled. The court adopted respondent's recommendation that petitioner be suspended from practice for two years but that the court stay execution of its order and place petitioner on probation for that period on conditions prescribed by respondent (including nine months actual suspension) and order him to comply with Cal. R. Ct. 955 (a), (c) within 30 and 40 days respectively. The court rejected petitioner's argument that the court did not have authority to discipline him for his pre-admission conduct, holding that the court had inherent power to discipline an attorney for conduct either in or out of his profession which showed him to be unfit to practice; it was irrelevant that the misconduct preceded his admission to practice in California.

The court adopted the recommendation of respondent Board of Governors of the State Bar and ordered that petitioner attorney be suspended from the practice of law for two years, stayed, and that petitioner be placed on probation for that period based on a finding that petitioner committed acts involving moral turpitude before his admission to practice law in California.

Appellant challenged a ruling of the Superior Court of Alameda County (California) granting respondents' motions for summary judgment, asserting that its attorney's pre-civil litigation communications were protected under Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b).

Appellant employee and several others left respondent employer to work for a competitor. Respondents employer and its attorney sent appellant's new employer a pre-civil litigation demand letter referencing his prior criminal history and telephoned his probation officer to stop appellant from soliciting respondent's employees. Appellant sued respondents. The trial court granted respondent's motions for summary judgment asserting that the communications were either protected by the litigation privilege of Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b) or § 47(c). Appellant challenged the ruling. The court reversed, holding that reasonable limits should and do exist on the type and character of pre-litigation statements which are protected by privilege. The litigation privilege applied to pre-litigation communications. The communication must be connected with or have some logical relation to the action, i.e., that it not be extraneous to the action. The court further held that the inclusion in respondents' pre-litigation demand letter's reference to appellant's prior criminal history was not privileged under § 47(b). The telephone communication was also not privileged.

The court reversed the summary judgment for respondents because their pre-civil litigation communications were not protected by the asserted statutory privilege as they discredited appellant and were substantially extraneous to the threatened litigation.