TOP SE CRE OMIN ONW OF ORN

1109-0002 WORKING DRAFT
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
24 March 2009
(U) TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. (U) INTRODUCTION ..1
II. REVIEW CATEGORIES ..3

(U) APPENDIX A: About the Review

(U) APPENDIX B: Presidential Authorizations

(U) APPENDIX C: Timeline of Key Events

(U) APPENDIX D: NSA Legal Review of the Presidential Authorization

(U) APPENDIX E: Flowchart of Metadata Analysis

(U) APPENDIX F: Flowchart of Content Analysis
(U) APPENDIX G: Security Clearances for President's Surveillance Program

(U) APPENDIX H: NSA Office of the Inspector General Reports on President's
Surveillance Program

I. INTRODUCTION

(U) This Report

On 4 October 2001, President George W. Bush issued a
memorandum entitled FOR SPECIFIED
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES DURING A LIMITED
PERIOD TO DETECT AND PREVENT ACTS OF TERRORISM
WITHIN THE UNITED The memorandum was based on the
President's determination that after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks
in the United States, an extraordinary emergency existed for national
defense purposes.

The 4 October 2001 Presidential authorization delegated
authority to the Secretary of Defense, who further delegated it to the
Director of National Securitv Agencv/Chief. Central Securitv Service
to conduct specified electronic surveillance on targets
related to Afghanistan and intemational terrorism for 30 days. Because the
surveillance included wire and cable communications carried into or out of
the United States, it would otherwise have required FISC authority.
The Authorization specified that NSA could acquire the
content and associated metadata of telephony and Internet communications
for which there was probable cause to believe that one of the
communicants was in Afghanistan or that one communicant was engaged
in or preparing for acts of intemational terrorism. In addition, NSA was
authorized to acquire telephony and Internet metadata' for communications
with at least one communicant outside the United States or for which no
communicant was known to be a citizen of the United States. NSA was
also allowed to retain, process, analyze and disseminate intelligence from
the communications acquired under the authority. 2

This report provides the classified results of the NSA Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) review of the President's Surveillance
Program (PSP) as mandated in the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) of 2008.
It includes the facts necessary to describe from NSA's perspective:

1 (U)Metadata is data that describes content, events, or networks associated with SIGINT targets.
2 (U)The Authority changed over time. See Appendix for details.

establishment of the PSP (Section One)
implementation and product of the PSP (Section Two)

access to legal reviews of the PSP and access to information about
the PSP (Section Three)

interaction with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
and transition to court orders related to the PSP (Section Four)
oversight of PSP activities at NSA (Section Five)

(U) President's Surveillance Program Terminology

For purposes of this report, the PSP, or "the Program," refers
to NSA activities conducted under the authority of the 4 October 2001
memorandum and subsequent renewals, hereafter known as "the
Authorization." As mandated by the FAA, this review includes activities
authorized by the President between 11 September 2001 and 17 January
2007 and those activities continued under FISC authority. This includes
the program described by the President in a

17 December 2005 radio address as the Terrorist Surveillance Program,
which was content collected under the Authorization.

II. REVIEW CATEGORIES

(U) ONE: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AUTHORITY

U0) Immediately afler the attacks of September 200], NSA considered
how to work within existing SIGINT authorities to counter the terrorist threat
within the United States and adjusted SIGINT processes accordingly. Shortly
thereafier, in response to a White House request, the Director of NSA identified
SIGINT collection gaps. The Counsel to the Vice President used this information
to draft the Presidential authorization that established the PSP.

(U) Actions Taken After 9/11

On 14 September 2001, three days after terrorist attacks in the
United States, General Hayden approved the targeting of terrorist-
associated foreign telephone numbers on communication links between the
United States and foreign countries where terrorists were known to be
operating. Only specified, pre--approved numbers were allowed to be
tasked for collection against U.S.--originating links. He authorized this
collection at Special Collection Service and Foreign Satellite sites with
access to links between the United States and countries of interest,
including Afghanistan. According to the Deputy General Counsel, General
Hayden determined by 26 September that any Afghan telephone number in
contact with a U.S. telephone number on or after 26 September was
presumed to be of foreign intelligence value and could be disseminated to
the FBI.

NSA OGC said General Hayden's action was a lawfiil
exercise of his power under Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, United States
Intelligence Activities, as amended. The targeting of communication links
with one end in the United States was a more aggressive use of E.O. 12333
authority than that exercised by former Directors. General Hayden was
operating in a unique environment in which it was a widely held belief that
additional terrorist attacks on U.S. soil were imminent. General Hayden
said this was a "tactical decision."

On 2 October 2001, General Hayden briefed the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) on this decision and
later informed members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(SSCI) by telephone. He had also informed DCI George Tenet.

(TS) At the same time NSA was assessing collection gaps and increasing

efforts against terrorist targets immediately after the 11 September attacks, .

it was responding to Department of Defense (DOD), Director of Central
Intelligence Community Management Staff questions about its ability to
counter the new threat.

(U) Need to Expand NSA Authority

NSA

General Hayden said that soon after he told Mr. Tenet about
NSA actions to counter the threat, Mr. Tenet shared the information with
the "Oval Office." Mr. Tenet relayed that the Vice President wanted to
know if NSA could be doing more. General Hayden replied that nothing
else could be done within existing NSA authorities. In a follow-up
telephone conversation, Mr. Tenet asked General Hayden what could be
done if he had additional authorities. General Hayden said that these
discussions were not documented.

Identifies SIGIN Collection Gaps

To respond to the Vice President, General Hayden met with
NSA personnel who were already working to identify and fill SIGINT
collection gaps in light of the recent terrorist attacks. General Hayden
stated that he met with personnel to identify which additional authorities
would be operationally useful and technically feasible. In particular,
discussions focused on how NSA might bridge the "international gap." An
NSA Technical Director described that gap in these terms:

"Here is NSA standing at the US. border looking outward for
foreign threats. There is the FBI looking within the United
States for domestic threats. But no one was looking at the
foreign threats coming into the United States. That was a
huge gap that NSA wanted to cover.

Possible Solutions. Among other things, NSA considered
how to tweak transit collection--the collection of communications
transiting through but not originating or terminating in the United States.
NSA personnel also resurfaced a concept proposed in 1999 to address the Millennium Threat. NSA proposed that it would perform contact chaining
on metadata it had collected. would chain through masked U.S.
telephone numbers to discover foreign connections to those numbers,
without specifying, even for the U.S. number involved. In
December 1999, the Department of Justice Office of Intelligence
Policy Review (OIPR) told NSA that the proposal fell within one of the
FISA definitions of electronic surveillance and, therefore, was not
permissible when applied to metadata associated with presumed U.S.
persons U.S. telephone numbers not approved for targeting by the
FISC).

Collection gaps not adequately filled by FISA
authorized intercept. NSA determined that FISA authorization did not
allow sufficient flexibility to counter the new terrorist threat. First, it
believed that because of technological advances, the jurisdiction of the

ISC went beyond the original intent of the statute. For example, most
communications signals no longer flowed through radio or
via phone svstems as they did in 1978 when the FISA was written. By
2001, Internet communications were used worldwide, undersea cables
carried huge volumes of communications, and a large amount of the
world's communications passed through the United States. Because of
language used in the Act in 1978, NSA was required to obtain court orders
to target email accounts used by non-U.S. persons outside the United States
if it intended to intercept the communications at a webmail service within
the United States. Large numbers of terrorists were using such accounts in
200 1 .

Second, NSA believed that the FISA process was unable to
accommodate the number of terrorist targets or the speed with which they
changed their communications. From the time NSA sent FISA requests to
the OIPR until the time data arrived at NSA, the average wait was
between four and six weeks. Terrorists could have changed their telephone
numbers or internet addresses before NSA received FISC approval to target
them. NSA believed the large number of terrorist targets and their
frequently changing communications would have overwhelmed the
existing FISA process.

Emergency FISA provision not an option. NSA
determined that even using emergency FISA court orders would not
provide the speed and flexibility needed to counter the terrorist threat.
First, although the emergency authorization provision permitted 72 hours
of surveillance without obtaining a court order, it did not--as many
believed--allow the Government to undertake surveillance immediately.
Rather, the Attomey General had to ensure that emergency surveillance
would ultimately be acceptable to the FISC. He had to be certain the court
would grant a warrant before initiating emergency surveillance.
Additionally, before NSA surveillance requests were submitted to the
Attomey General, they had to be reviewed by NSA intelligence officers,
NSA attorneys, and Department of Justice attomeys. Each reviewer had to
be satisfied that standards had been met before the request proceeded to the
next review group, and each request was certified by a senior official in the
usually the Secretary or Deputy Secretary. From the time NSA sent a
request to Justice's OIPR until the time data arrived at NSA, the average
wait was between half. In the existing threat
environment with U.S. interests at risk, NSA deemed the wait too long.

Early Efforts to Amend FISA

Given the limitations of FISA, there were early
efforts to amend the statute. For example, shortly after 11
September, the HPSCI asked NSA for technical assistance
in drafting a proposal to amend Section of FISA that
would give the President the authority to conduct electronic
surveillances without a court order for the purpose of
obtaining foreign intelligence information. On

20 September 2001, the NSA General Counsel wrote to
Judge Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, asking
whether the proposal had merit. We found no record of a
response.

We could not determine why early efforts to
amend FISA were abandoned. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that government officials feared the public debate
surrounding any changes to FISA would compromise
intelligence sources and methods.



(U) NSA identifies SIGINT collection gaps to Vice President's Office.

Because early discussions about expanding NSA's authority
were not documented, we do not have records of specific topics discussed
or people who attended General Hayden's meetings with White House
representatives. General Hayden stated that after consulting with NSA
personnel, he described to the White House how NSA collection of
communications on a wire inside the United States was constrained by the
FISA statute. Specifically, NSA could not collect from a wire in the United

States, without a court order, either content or metadata from
communications links with either one or both ends in the United States.
Furthermore, General Hayden pointed out that communications metadata
did not have the same level of constitutional protection as content and that
access to metadata of communications with one end in the United States
would significantly enhance NSA's analytic capabilities. General Hayden
suggested that the ability to collect communications with one end in the
United States without a court order would increase NSA's speed and
agility. General Hayden stated that after two additional meetings with the
Vice President, the Vice President asked him to work with his Counsel,
David Addington.

(U) Presidential Authorization Drafted and Signed

According to General Hayden, the Vice President's
Counsel, David Addington, drafted the first Authorization. General
Hayden described himself as the "subject matter expert" but stated that no
other NSA personnel participated in the drafting process, including the
General Counsel. He also said that Department of Justice (DOJ)
representatives were not involved in any of the discussions that he attended
and he did not otherwise inform them.

General Hayden said he was "surprised with a small
when the Authorization was signed on 4 October 2001, and that it only
changed the location from which NSA could collect communications.

Rules for minimizing U.S. person information still had to be followed.

SIGINT Activity Authorized by the President

On 4 October 2001, the President delegated authority
through the Secretary of Defense to the Director of NSA to conduct
specified electronic surveillance on targets related to Afghanistan and
international terrorism for 30 days. Because the surveillance included wire
and cable communications carried into or out of the United States, it would
otherwise have required FISC authority.

F) The Authorization allowed NSA to conduct four types
of collection activity:

Telephony content

Intemet content

Telephony metadata
Intemet metadata

F) NSA could collect the content and associated metadata of
telephony and Intemet communications for which there was probable cause
to believe that one of the communicants was in Afghanistan or that one.
communicant was engaged in or preparing for acts of international
terrorism. In addition, NSA was authorized to acquire telephony and
Intemet metadata for communications with at least one communicant
outside the United States or for which no communicant was known to be a
citizen of the United States. NSA was also allowed to retain, process,
analyze and disseminate intelligence from the communications acquired
under the authority.

Subsequent Changes to the Authorization

After the first Presidential authorization, the specific terms,
wording, or interpretation of the renewals periodically changed. (See
Appendix for a completed listing of changes.)

Domestic Collection. The wording of the first
authorization could have been interpreted to allow domestic content
collection where both communicants were located in the US. or were U.S.
persons. General Hayden recalled that when the Counsel to the Vice
President pointed this out, General Hayden told him that NSA would not
collect domestic communications because 1) NSA was a foreign intelligence
agency, 2) NSA infrastructure did not support domestic collection, and 3) his
personal standard was so high that there would be no problem getting a
FISC order for domestic collection.

F) Afghanistan. In January 2002, after the Taliban was forced
out of power, Afghanistan was no longer specifically identified in the
Authorization.

Iraqi Intelligence Service. For a limited period of time
surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the President authorized the use of
PSP authority against the Iraqi Intelligence Service. On 28 March 2003,
the DCI determined that, based on then current intelligence, the Iraqi
Intelligence service was engaged in terrorist activities and presented a
threat to U.S. interests in the United States and abroad. Through the
Deputy DCI, Mr. Tenet received the President's concurrence that PSP
authorities could be used against the Iraqi Intelligence Service. NSA
ceased using the Authority for this purpose in March 2004.

(U) TWO: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AUTHORITY AND
RESULTING SIGINT PRODUCT

General Hayden said that although he felt comfortable
exercising the Presidential authorization and believed it to be legal, he
recognized that it was politically sensitive and controversial and would be
subjected to scrutiny at some point in time. He and NSA leadership strove
to ensure that NSA personnel executed the terms of the Authorization with
care and diligence and that they not go beyond that which was authorized.
PSP-related operations began on 6 October. Early on, personnel worked
under the assumption that the Authorization was temporary and that
operations would stop in the near future. After it became evident that the
Authority would be continuously renewed, management focused on
designing processes and procedures for Program activity.

(UIIFOUO) Stand Up of Operations

On 4 October 2001, after receiving the Authorization, General
Hayden informed the SIGINT Director and other key personnel of NSA's
new authorities and asked the NSA General Counsel if the Authorization
was legal. The General Counsel said that the next day, 5 October, he told
General Hayden that he believed it was legal (see Appendix D).

Under General Hayden's direction, immediate steps were
taken to implement the temporary authority.

A 24-hour watch operation, the Metadata Analysis Center (MAC),
was created in the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID).

The first Program Manager was identified and informed of his new
responsibilities.

A cadre of experienced operational personnel was chosen to
implement the Program.

Office space was identified to accommodate newly assigned
personnel.

A new security compartment with the temporary cover term
STARBURST was established?

Fifiy computer servers to store and process data acquired under the
new authority were orderedfi

Initial funding of $25 million for PSP operations was obtained from
the DCI.

On Saturday and Sunday, 6 and 7 October, small groups of
operational personnel were called at home and asked to report to work for
special PSP clearance briefings.

On Monday, 8 October 2001, Columbus Day, General
Hayden briefed the programmers, and mathematicians that had
been selected to implement the Authorization. At that briefing, General
Hayden said he did not share the specific content of the Authorization with
attendees but relayed key information such as:

The Authorization came from the President.
The Authorization was temporary.

The Authorization was intended to be an early warning system of
impending terrorist attacks in the United States.

The NSA General Counsel had reviewed the Authorization and
concluded that it was legal.

NSA would do exactly what the Authorization stated and "not one
electron or photon more."

The Authorization should be kept secret and it required strict
compartmentation. Attendees had to sign a non-disclosure
agreement.

General Hayden stated that afier he briefed the attendees, he
tumed the briefing over to the General Counsel to discuss the terms of the
Authorization.

A permanent cover term, STELLARWIND, was assigned to Program information on 31 October

2001.

F) Because of the heightened terrorist threat, at NSA's request, a vendor diverted a shipment of
servers intended for other recipients to NSA, where they arrived under police escort on 13 October 2001.

(U) Early Operations

Within one week, approximately 90 NSA employees were
cleared for access to the PSP. On 11 October 2001, the Associate General
Counsel for Operations and the NSA Deputy General Counsel were cleared
for the Program and agreed with the NSA General Counsel's determination
that the Authorization was legal. NSA OGC did not formally document its
opinions or legal rationale (see Appendix D).

The MAC was created to analyze metadata obtained
under PSP authorization. By 7 October 2001, it was a 24-hour 7-day a
week watch center with 20 reporters, and software developers
working in three shifts. Many MAC employees were former Russian traffic
with manual call chaining analysis experience. Initially, the MAC
reported directly to General Hayden and the Deputy Director. The MAC
Chief briefed the Director every week, and the Deputy Director visited
MAC spaces for a briefing each evening.

While the MAC was setting up to analyze PSP metadata, the
Counterterrorism (CT) Product Line was realigning to conduct PSP content
tasking and analysis. The MAC and the CT Product Line worked closely
together to coordinate efforts and share information. The CT Product Line
was growing rapidly as handpicked employees were moved to support the
new mission.

Within 30 days, the PSP was fully operational. While
awaiting deliveryof requested computer servers, the FBI and CLA gave
NSA lead telephone numbers, and the MAC was able to immediately chain
within the United States with SIGINT collected overseas. Private sector
partners began to send telephony and Intemet content to NSA in October
2001. They began to send telephony and Intemet metadata to NSA as early
as November 2001.

(UIIFOUO) On-Going Operations

After operations began and it became evident that the
Authorization was likely to be renewed indefinitely, NSA management
became increasingly focused on designing processes and procedures to
implement the Program effectively and to ensure compliance with the
Authorization

(U) Organizational Structure

NSA conducted all PSP analysis and reporting at its
headquarters at Ft. Meade, Maryland, within the SIGIN Directorate.
Specifically, tasking approvals, analysis, and reporting were conducted in
the CT Product Line within SID, Analysis and Production. Collection of
data was managed in SID, Directorate for Acquisition. No PSP activities
were managed at NSA field sites.

will insert high level SID org chart from 2001 here]

Although the formal chain of command for SIGINT
operations was through SID, in practice, the Director and Deputy Director
of managed the Program while keeping the SIGINT Director
informed. Over time, the SIGINT Director became more involved, but the
Director and Deputy Director always maintained direct operational control.

Program Manager. Five officials held the Program
Manager position over the life of the Initially, the Program Manager
reported to the Chief of the CT Product Line. In 2004, the Program
Manager position was restructured as the SID Program Manager for CT
Special Projects and elevated to report to the SIGINT Director. This
allowed the Program Manager jurisdiction of PSP elements across SID, not
just those within the Directorate for Analysis and Production. At that time,
the position was also formally designated as a senior level civilian position.
A small staff was added to form the Program Management Office.

SID Analysis and Production. Initially, the MAC
analyzed PSP metadata (data that describes the content, events, or networks
associated with SIGINT targets), while SIGINT Development in the CT
Product Line analyzed non-PSP metadata. The CT Product Line performed
PSP content analysis. SIGINT Development, a separate organization
within the SID, managed approvals for content tasking. In 2004, the
analysis and production of metadata and content were consolidated into a
new organization called the Advanced Analysis Division (AAD). AAD
was divided into three teams: intemet metadata, telephony metadata, and
content.

Coordination with FBI and CIA. By 2004, four FBI
integrees and two CLA integrees, operating under SIGINT authorities in
accordance with written agreements, were co-located with NSA PSP-

The Chief of the CT Product Line was Acting Program Manager for a brief time in 2004.

cleared The purpose of co-locating these individuals was to
improve collaborative analytic efforts.

SID Data Acquisition. Through the life of the Program,
data collection was managed by Special Source Operations in SID, Data
Acquisition Directorate. Collection managers were responsible for putting
telephone numbers and email selectors on PSP-authorized collection by
private sector companies and taking them off collection.

The authority to collect bulk telephony and Internet metadata
significantly enhanced NSA's ability to identify activity that may have been
terrorist-related. Contact chaining is the process of building a network
graph that models the communication (e-mail, telephony, etc.) pattems of
targeted entities (people, organizations, etc) and their associates from the
communications sent or received by the targets." Metadata is data that
describes other data, specifically information that describes the content,
events or networks associated with SIGINT targets. For example, for an
email message, it would include the sender and recipient email addresses.
It does not contain the subject line or the text of the email; they are
considered to be content. Likewise. for a telephone conversation. metadata
would include the called number and the calling number as well as the
duration ofthe call.

Although NSA had the capability to collect bulk telephony
and Intemet metadata prior to the PSP, its application was limited because
NSA did not have the authority to collect communications in which one
end (the number being called or the recipient address of an e-mail) was in
the United States. PSP significantly increased the data available to NSA
and allowed them to create more thorough Contact chaining. This
gave NSA the key to an early warning system--the ability to identify
individuals in the United States or individuals outside the U.S. using U.S.
telecommunications structures in contact with a foreign target, a terrorist.

Because metadata was not constitutionally protected, NSA
did not consider it to be as sensitive as content collection. Nevertheless,
processes were set up to document requests for metadata analysis and
justifications for conducting such analysis under Program authority. The

5 Additional chaining can be performed on the associates' contacts to determine pattems in
the way a network of targets may communicate. Additional degrees of separation from the initial target are
referred to as "hops." For example a direct contact is one hop away from the target. A contact of the direct
contact would be described as being 2 hops away from the target. The resulting contact-graph is subsequently
analyzed for intelligence and to develop potential investigative leads.

following describes the process used to obtain requests, conduct analysis,
and report results under the PSP. (See Appendix for a flowchart of the
end-to-end process.)

Requests for Information and Leads. Contact chaining
analysis requests were received from FBI, CIA, or NSA. Requests
typically took one of two forms, Requests for Information (RF 1) and Leads.
RFIS were specific questions about a target's telephone numbers or email
addresses, called "selectors" at NSA. Leads were more general requests
about a target's' contacts. Requestors submitted leads to discover new
investigative leads. Contact chaining requests were documented from the
inception of the PSP.

Approvals to Chain. Prior to chaining, NSA
counterterrorism shift coordinators reviewed chaining requests to
determine whether they met criteria provided by the OGC and based on the
terms of the Authorization. They had to have enough information to
identify a terrorism nexus and demonstrate compliance with criteria
required by the Authorization before analysis could begin. Shift
coordinators either approved requests, approved them for 1-hop (direct
contact) analysis, or denied them. Approved requests were passed to
for contact chaining.

Analysis. NSA used a variety of tools to conduct
metadata analysis and view the results. NSA's primary tool for conducting
metadata analysis, for PSP and traditional SIGINT collection, was
MAINWAY. MAINWAY was used for storage, contact chaining, and for
analyzing large volumes of global communications metadata. At the
beginning of the PSP, only the Navigator" tool was available to
View MAINWAY output. Over time, new tools and new processes, such as
automated chaining alerting, were created to improve efficiency.
To obtain the most complete results, used data collected under PSP
and non-PSP authorities. Typically, they analyzed networks with two
degrees of separation (two hops) from the target. determined if
resulting information was reportable.

F) In addition, an automated chaining alert process was
created to alert of new potentially reportable selectors. Previously
approved selectors were compared to incoming MAINWAY data
authorized by the PSP, E.O. 12333, or the FISC. Alerts of direct contacts
with approved selectors were reported to NSA for further analysis
and potential reporting to FBI and CIA.

Storage. NSA stored metadata obtained under PSP
authorities in a protected database. Only cleared and trained were
given access to PSP metadata.

Reporting. Reports based on metadata analysis were
typically referred to as "tippers." Tippers contained contact chaining
analysis results relevant to terrorism or with potential links to terrorism that
warranted the attention of the FBI or the CIA for further investigation.
Before releasing reports with U.S. person information, obtained
permission to do so in accordance with established NSA dissemination
procedures.

F) For each published report, NSA retained documentation
of the analysis, supporting RFI or lead information, and a justification
statement explaining the link to terrorism. If a report was not published,
documentation was not retained. Counterterrorism personnel manually
updated information in a computer tracking system to reflect the
disposition of chaining requests.

Collection and analysis of content is NSA's traditional wav of

reporting SIGINT. Content generally refers to words
spoken during a telephone conversation or the written text of an email
message. NSA collection of the content of telephony and Intemet
communications under the PSP improved its ability to produce intelligence
on terrorist--related activity. For example, by allowing NSA access to links
carrying communications with one end in the United States, NSA
significantly increased its access to transiting foreign communications,
with both communicants outside the United States. General Hayden
described this as "the real gold of the Program." And, by allowing the
intercept of international communications, NSA was able to identify threats
within the United States.

From the start of the Program until January 2007, NSA issued
490 reports based on PSP--derived content information. Also, as shown
below, approximately 37,664 telephony and Intemet selectors were tasked
for

PSP-authorized content collection during that time period. Only 8 percent
were U.S. targets. The vast majority

(92 percent) were foreign.

Approximate Number of Selectors Targeted for PSP Content Collection
4 Oct 2001 to 17 Jan 2007
U.S. Telephony
U.S. E-mail
(406)
Foreign E-mail
(19,000)


NSA leadership considered selectors for targets located in the
United States to be extremely sensitive. As such, processes were set up to
ensure strict compliance with the terms of the Authorization. The
following describes the general process for tasking, collecting, storing and
reporting telephony and Intemet content under the PSP. (See Appendix
for a flowchart of the end-to-end process.)

Tasking Approvals. Under the PSP, each domestic
selector tasked for content collection was formally approved and tracked.
submitted content collection requests, also called tasking
packages, to the Chief of CT for approval. Tasking packages contained a
narrative analysis, conclusion, supporting information, documentation, and
a checklist of package contents. In the Chief 's absence, the Deputy Chief
of CT or the Program Manager could approve the requests. The approving
officials reviewed the tasking packages to ensure that the proposed target
and related metadata selectors met criteria in the Authorization. If criteria
were not met, the officials requested additional information or denied the
request. In limited cases, collection was approved for specific time
periods. If the content contained foreign intelligence, the time period for
collection would be extended. If it did not, collection was stopped. All
approvals were documented in tasking packages.

F) Foreign selectors tasked for PSP content collection did not
require formal approvals or tasking packages. were responsible
for determining whether a foreign selector met the criteria for foreign

intelligence

Collection. After a selector was approved for PSP
eentent collection, it was identified as "tasked" in the STELLARWIND
Addresses Database by tasking managers who then emailed a
collection tasking request to the SSO Collection Manager for telephony
and Intemet content collection. Foreign selector content collection
requests were sent directly to the SSO Collection Manager. They did not
require special approval.

SSO collection managers were responsible for
ensuring that telephony and Internet content selectors were put on or taken
off collection. For elepl1or1v content selectors, collection
managers sent content collection tasking instructions to private sector
companies. Private sector companies were responsible for implementing
tasking at front-end devices to obtain the required content collection. For
Internet content selectors, collection managers sent content tasking
instructions directly to equipment installed at

company--controlled locations. Collected data was sent back to
and made available to through the HYBRID voice processing
system for telephony content selectors or the PINWALE database for
Internet content selectors. SSO collection managers worked with private
sector companies and the CT Product Line to ensure that collected data was
as intended and legally authorized.

Storage. Content (voice or cll9ata_) collected under PSP was
stored in protected partitions in existing NSA databases. Access to the
partitions was restricted to PSP-cleared personnel.

Reporting. After analyzing content data collected under
Presidential authority and identifying foreign intelligence information,
counterterrorism wrote reports. After an initial review within the
CT Product Line, some reports were sent to SID Oversight and Compliance
for a second review for U.S. person identities. reviewers
determined whether the U.S. identities in the report were necessary to
assess or understand the foreign intelligence information being reported
was required within the conduct of recipient's official duties . If an identity
was found to be unnecessary, it was not reported. Before any U.S. person
information was disseminated in reporting, intemal NSA approvals were
obtained as required by United States Signals Intelligence Directive
SP0018 -- Legal Compliance and Minimization Procedures.


Initially, NSA responded to FBI and CIA information
requests in email. These initial reports, sometimes called
"Tippers" or "Snippets," were "hidden in plain sight," meaning the
information in the report did not reveal the source of the information.
Later, FBI and CIA wanted to understand how NSA knew certain
information that could not be provided in normal reporting channels.
Eventually, "tear line" reporting was established. Tear lines are used
regularly by NSA as a way to report SIGINT-derived information and
sanitized information in the same report to appropriately cleared
individuals. The sanitized "tear line" information conveys the same basic
facts as the COMINT--controlled information while hiding COMIN as the
source.

Dissemination of SIGINT Product

F) Regardless of which organization submitted requests or leads
to NSA, all resulting reports were sent to CIA and FBI. Reports answered
specific RFI questions or provided new investigative leads developed from
chaining analysis. Reports contained selectors of interest (potential leads)
with potential terrorist connections, not full chaining results. NSA had
minimal insight into how CIA and FBI used PSP products.

(U) Discovery Requests

(U) On occasion, the Department of Justice attomeys determine that
the facts of a particular matter justify a search of NSA files and submit a
search request. In response to those requests or in response to discovery
orders, NSA conducts a search of its databases to locate records that may
fall within the scope of DoJ's discovery obligations and Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Typically the search process begins
with a written request from including the names and aliases of
individuals. NSA attomeys work with personnel trained in the retrieval of
NSA reports to craft search strategies reasonably designed to identify
reporting that may be responsive to the request. These search strategies are
then used to perform electronic searches of NSA repositories of
disseminated foreign intelligence reports. All responsive reports, to the
extent any exist, are made available for review by

NSA searches only databases of reported intelligence and does not

search databases containing acquired but not processed information
raw traffic) or acquired and processed but not reported or disseminated


information/communications gists). NSA would include in its search
applicable disseminated foreign intelligence derived from the PSP.

After the search is completed, NSA provides all information,
including PSP-derived material, to a small number of appropriately cleared
individuals in the National Security Division who review the
information on behalf of the and file motions on behalf of the
govemment and the United States Attomey.

(U) Funding for NSA Activity Authorized by the PSP

NSA spent approximately $146,058,000 in CT
supplemental funds for Program activities from FY02 through FY06. The
funds were given annually to SID for Project MAINWAY hardware and
contract support, analytic tools and contract analytic support, and
collaborative partnerships with private sector companies. Funding requests
were submitted annually to the PSP Program Manager and CT program
budget officer. Each request had to justify why funds were needed and
how the purchased item or service would support SID's PSP activities.

Program Costs FY01 to FY06 (S in thousands)

Category Description FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 Total
Data Metadata and $25,668 $14,050 $15,500 $21,150 $25,900 $102,268
content
(including one
time set-up costs)
Tools and Processing, $9,700 $8,000 $8,000 $9,500 $8,000 $43,200
Systems display and
manipulations
capabilities
Infrastructure Facilities and $590 0 0 0 0 $590
equipment to
support program
TOTALS $35,958 $22,050 $23,500 $30,650 $33,900 $146,058

(U) THREE: ACCESS TO LEGAL REVIEWS, THE
AUTHORIZATION, AND INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROGRAM

NSA did not have access to the original OLC legal
opinion, but did have access and provided input to an OLC opinion
prepared in 2004. The original Authorization and renewals were kept
in the NSA Director's safe, and access to the documents was
controlled. By January 2007, nearly 3,000 people had been briefed
on the PSP, including members of Congress and the FISC.

(U) Access to Legal Reviews

The NSA did not have access to the early Ofiice of
Legal Counsel (OLC) opinions supporting the Attorney General's
statement that the PSP was legal. General Hayden, NSA lawyers, and the
NSA Inspector General agreed that it was not necessary for them to see the
early opinions in order to execute the terms of the Authorization, but felt it
would be helpful to do so. NSA was, however, given access and provided
comments to the OLC opinion issued in 2004.

(U) Access to OLC's Original Legal Review

Two NSA requests for access to the original OLC legal
opinion were denied.

First Request. NSA General Counsel Robert Deitz stated that
he asked the Vice President's Counsel if he could see the opinion. Even
though Mr. Deitz's request was denied, the Vice President's Counsel read a
few paragraphs of the opinion to him over the classified telephone line.

Second Request. At a 8 December 2003 meeting with the
Do] Associate Deputy Attomey General to discuss collection of metadata
and an upcoming NSA OIG compliance audit, NSA's IG and Deputy GC
requested to see the OLC legal opinion. The Counsel to the Vice President,
who unexpectedly attended the meeting, denied the request and said that
any request to see the opinion had to come directly from General Hayden.

General Hayden stated he never asked for or read the OLC
legal opinion supporting the PSP. The Deputy GC stated that it was his

understanding that the opinion was not shared with NSA because it was
considered confidential legal advice to the President.

The IG, GC, and Deputy GC agreed that their inability to read
the OLC opinion did not prevent or impair them from executing and
overseeing the Program. They were able to determine legality of the
Program independently from (see Appendix D). However, the IG said
that he found the secrecy surrounding the legal rationale to be "odd."
Specifically, he said that it was "strange that NSA was told to execute a
secret program that everyone knew presented legal questions, without
being told the underpinning legal theory." The IG, GC, and Deputy GC all
stated that they had yet to see the fiill text of the original OLC opinion.

Access to the May 2004 Opinion

In 2003 and 2004, the Associate Deputy Attomey General
and the OLC Assistant Attomey General visited NSA to receive briefings
on the PSP. On 04 May 2004, NSA, at the request of the OLC Assistant
Attomey General, provided comments on the OLC's draft opinion on the
Legality of the PSP. The OLC Assistant Attomey General submitted his
opinion on 06 May 2004.

Access to the Presidential Authorization

F) As directed by the White House, access to the original
Presidential authorization and subsequent renewals was controlled.

(C) The Vice President's Counsel drafted the Authorizations and personally
delivered them to NSA. On a few occasions, NSA picked up the
Authorization at the White House.

(C) The first Authorization and subsequent renewals were kept in a safe in
the Director's ofiice. Initially, access was limited to General Hayden and a
few others, including three OGC attomeys, Program Managers, and certain
operational personnel. Those with access were not allowed to disseminate
the Authorizations.

Importantly, most NSA operations personnel, including the
Chief of the CT Product Line, who approved tasking for content collection,
were not allowed to see the actual authorization. Rather, OGC answered
targeting, infonnation sharing, and implementation legal questions on an
"on call" basis for operators. When the Authorization changed, OGC

summarized those changes in emails distributed to key program executives
or communicated changes in due diligence meetings.

Such limited access to the Authorization was documented
in an IG investigation as a primary cause of two early violations of the
Authorization. At the IG's recommendation, in March 2003, General
Hayden began issuing Delegation of Authority letters that explained the
Authorization as it applied to executing the Program. A new Delegation of
Authority was promulgated with each renewal of the Authorization. The
Delegation of Authority letters were sent to the Program Manager and the
two managers of the SID CT Product Line and not further disseminated.
(See Section Six.)

(U) Access to Program Information

Between 4 October 2001 and 17 January 2007, NSA
cleared over 3,000 people for the PSP. The majority worked at NSA.
Others were fiom the CIA, the FBI, the Department of Justice, Congress,
the FISC, the ODNI, the White House, and the

PSP Clearance Totals

Agency Number of Cleared
Personnel
NSA 1,936
CIA 460
FBI 467
DOJ 64
Congress 60

FISC 14
ODNI 13
White House 14
DOD (excluding NSA) 5
Total 3,033

Within the first 30 days of the Program, over 190
people were cleared into the Program. This number included Senators
Robert Graham and Richard Shelby, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi,
President George W. Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, Counsel to the
Vice President David Addington, and Presidential Assistant 1. Lewis
"Scooter" Libby. By 31 January 2002, FISC Judge Royce Lamberth was
cleared. By June 2002, over 500 people had been cleared, including two
additional members of Congress, Senator Daniel Inouye and former
Senator Theodore Stevens, as well as FISC Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly.
See Appendix for a list, by date, of the number of people briefed into the
Program.

(U) Non-Operational Personnel

F) Knowledge of the PSP was strictly limited at the express
direction of the White House. General Hayden, over time, delegated his
PSP clearance approval authority for NSA, FBI, and CIA operational
personnel working the mission to the NSA PSP Program Manager. For
members of Congress, FISC, outside counsel for providers, and the NSA
IG, General Hayden had to obtain approval from the White House.

From the start, General Hayden and NSA leadership pushed to
keep members of the legislative and judicial branches of government
informed. General Hayden said he told the Vice President that concems about the lawfulness of the Authorization but worried about the
politics. After some hesitancy, the White House gave General Hayden
permission to brief certain members of Congress. In addition, the Chief
Judge of the FISC was first cleared in January 2002 (see Section

Interactions with Members of Congress. Between 25
October 2001 and 17 January 2007, General Hayden, sometimes supported
by operational target experts from the CT Product Line and SSO office,
conducted over 49 briefings to members of Congress or their stafi. (See
Appedix for a complete list of briefings.)

General Hayden first briefed the following members of
Congress on 25 October 2001:

Chair - House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Ranking Minority Member of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence

Chair Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Vice Chair -- Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

In addition, NSA received and responded to a variety of
Program-related inquiries from members of Congress, including Senators
Inouye, Stevens, Pelosi, and Rockefeller.

General Hayden always believed that the PSP was legal. He
said that during the many PSP-related briefings he gave to members of
Congress, no one ever said that NSA should stop what it was doing. He
emphasized that he did not just "flip through slides" during the briefings.
They lasted as long as attendees desired.

Interactions with the FISC. On 31 January 2002, Chief
Judge Royce Lamberth was briefed on the PSP and on 17 May 2002, his

successor, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, was briefed. A law clerk was also
briefed in April 2004. (See Section Five.)

The Clearance Process

F) NSA managed the NSA clearance process. Clearance
requests were submitted to the PSP Program Office for Program Manager
approval or disapproval. Access was granted only to those who needed

to perform assigned job duties. The Program Manager questioned access
requests with unclear justifications. Approved requests were forwarded to
the Program security officer, who performed a security check. If the
security check yielded nothing to impede access, individuals were
instructed to go to the security office to read the "Security Pre-Brief
Agreement" and sign a "Sensitive Compartmented Information
Nondisclosure Agreement" form. NSA's General Counsel also had the
authority to read in Attomeys from other agencies.

On 20 May 2005, the Program Manager changed the PSP
clearance request and re-certification process. The Project Security Officer
assigned to Special Source Operations in the SIGINT Directorate assumed
responsibility for the PSP clearance process. (Special Source Operations
managed all PSP-related collection for NSA.) Additionally, the Program
Manager initiated PSP clearance briefings.

From 4 October 2001 until 23 May 2005, a two-level PSP
clearance structure was used. One level was limited to the "fact of"
Program existence. A second level included access to PSP targeting data
through a "must know" principle. Access lists were maintained in the SSO
Security Director's office on an internal SSO compartmented LAN.

F) Regular zero-based reviews were conducted by the SSO
Security Director's office quarterly to validate that cleared individuals had
a continuing need for access to PSP information. The clearance did not
automatically transfer with individuals who moved to new assignments.
The clearance had to be re-justified for the new position, or the individual
would be debriefed from the Program.

(U) FOUR: NSA PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIPS

To conduct foreign intelligence-gathering activities
under the PSP, NSA required the assistance of private companies,
which provided access to international communications chokepoints
in United States. Immediately after 11 September 2001, some private
companies contacted NSA to offer support. Subsequent to PSP
authorization, NSA sent request letters to companies stating that
their assistance was authorized by the President with legal
concurrence of the Attorney General.

(U) Need for Private Sector Cooperation

The United States carries out foreign intelligence activities
through a variety of means. One of the most effective means is to partner
with commercial entities to obtain access to information that would not
otherwise be available.

Telephony

Most intemational telephone calls are routed through a small
number of switches or "chokepoints" in the international telephone
switching system en route to their final destination. The United States is a
major crossroads for intemational switched telephone traffic. For example,
in 2003, circuit switches worldwide carried approximately 180 billion
minutes of telephone communications. Twenty percent of this amount,
over 37 billion minutes, either originated or terminated in the United
States, and another thirteen percent, over 23 billion minutes, transited the
United States (neither originating nor terminating here). is
authorized under Executive Order 12333 to acquire transiting telephone
calls.]

F) NSA determined that under the Authorization it could gain
access to approximately 81% of the intemational calls into and out of the
United States through three corporate partners: COMPANY A had access to
39%, COMPANY 28%, and COMPANY 14%. NSA did not seek

assistance from local exchange carriers, because that would have given
NSA access primarily to domestic calls

Internet Communications

F) Al Qaeda and associated terrorist organizations have made
extensive use of the Intemet. It is their preferred method of
communication. Terrorists use Intemet communications, particularly web-
based services, because they are ubiquitous, anonymous, and usually free
of charge. They can access Web-based email accounts and similar services
from any origination point around the world.

F) The United States is a major Internet communications hub.
The industry standard for characterization of the volume of Intemet
communications is bandwidth, which measures the amount of digital data
transmitted in one second -- bits per second or bps. For example, data
available from 2002 shows that at that time, worldwide intemational
bandwidth was more than 290 Gbps7. Of that total, less than 2.5
was between two regions that did not include the United States.

The United States is also home to computer servers providing
Internet communications services often used by terrorists. The majority of
known terrorist email addresses that NSA has tracked are hosted on U.S.-
based providers or foreign--managed providers hosted on servers in the

United States-


(UIIFOUO) Evolution of NSA Partnerships with Private Sector

(U) History of NSA Partnerships with Private Sector

As far back as World War II, NSA has had classified
relationships with carefully vetted U.S. companies that assist with essential
foreign intelligence-gathering activities. NSA maintains relationships with
over 100 U.S. companies. Without their cooperation, NSA would not be
able respond to intelligence requirements on a variety of topics important
to the United States.

Two of the most productive SIGINT collection partnerships
that NSA has with the private sector are with COMPANYA and
COMPANY B. These two relationships enable NSA to access large
volumes of foreign-to-foreign communications transiting the United States

is an abbreviation for Gigabits per second, which can also be described as one billion bits per second
or 1,000,000,000 bps.

through f1ber--optic cables, gateway switches, and data networks. They also
provide foreign intelligence authorized under the FISA.

According to General Alexander, General Hayden's
replacement as Director of if the relationships with these
companies were ever terminated, the U.S. SIGINT system would be
irrevocably damaged, because NSA would have sacrificed America's home
field advantage as the primary hub for worldwide telecommunications.

(U) Partnerships after 11 September 2001

According to the former Deputy Chief of SSO, between 11
September 2001 and the 4 October 2001 Authorization, COMPANY A and
COMPANY contacted NSA and asked "what can we do to help?"
COMPANY personnel approached NSA SSO personnel through an
existing program. They said they noticed odd pattems in domestic calling
records surrounding the events of 11 September and offered call records
and analysis. With no appropriate authority under which to accept the call
records, NSA suggested the company contact the FBI.

Partnerships Supporting the PSP

F) Once the Authorization was signed on 4 October 2001, NSA
began a process of identifying and visiting commercial entities requesting
their support. While requesting help from corporate entities to support the
PSP, NSA personnel made it clear that the PSP was a cooperative program
and participation was voluntary. NSA knew that the PSP was an
extraordinary program and understood if companies viewed it as too much
of a liability.

NSA Approaches to Private Sector Companies

2001: On Columbus Day, 8 October 2001, NSA Special
Source Operations (SSO) personnel responsible for the access relationships
with corporate partners COMPANY A, COMPANY B, and COMPANY
were called in to work and informed that the President had authorized the
PSP on 4 October 2001. The SSO personnel were tasked with initiating a
dialog with the respective TS/SCI-cleared officials from COMPANIES A,
B, and to seek their cooperation under the new Authorization. Over the
next few business days, SSO personnel met separately with ofiicials from
the three companies. Each company agreed to cooperate.

Upon confirmation that formal NSA letters requesting their
assistance were forthcoming, the providers, acting independently and
officially unaware of the cooperating agreements with other companies,
initiated collection to support the PSP.

2002: In early 2002, NSA SSO personnel met with the Senior
Vice President of Govemment Systems and other employees from
COMPANY E. Under the authority of the PSP, NSA asked COMPANY
to provide call detail records (CDR) in support of security for the 2002
Olympics in Salt Lake City. On 11 February 2002, the company's CEO
agreed to cooperate with NSA. On 19 February 2002, COMPANY
submitted a written proposal that discussed methods it could use to
regularly replicate call record information stored in a COMPANY facility
and potentially forward the same information to NSA. Discussions with
COMPANY continued in 2003. However, the COMPANY General
Counsel ultimately decided not to support NSA.

On 5 September 2002, NSA legal and operational personnel
met with intemet provider COMPANY D's General Counsel to discuss the
PSP and ask for the company's support. COMPANY provided support,
but it was minimal. (For a description of COMPANY D's support, see
page "What Providers

On 29 October 2002, NSA legal and operational personnel
met with intemet provider COMPANY F's Legal and Corporate Affairs
personnel, and a former NSA OGC employee hired by COMPANY as
independent counsel. NSA requested COMPANY F's support under the
PSP for email content. At the meeting, COMPANY requested a letter
from the Attomey General certifying the legality of the PSP. In December
2002, NSA's Commercial Technologies Group was informed that the
company's CEO agreed to support the PSP. According to NSA's General
Counsel, COMPANY did not participate in the PSP because of corporate
liability concerns.

F) 2003: In April 2003, NSA legal and operational personnel
met with the President and Chief Operating Officer, General Counsel, and
other personnel from private sector COMPANY G. After the meeting, the
company's General Counsel wanted to seek the opinion of outside counsel.
NSA determined the risk associated with additional disclosure outweighed
what COMPANY would have provided. NSA decided to not pursue a
partnership with this company.

NSA Letters to Private Sector

F) The Director sent letters to private sector companies
requesting their assistance with the PSP. NSA OGC drafted the letters for
the Director, tracked each renewal of the President's_authorization and
modified the letters accordingly, and ensured the letters were delivered to
the companies. Between 16 October 2001 and 14 December 2006, NSA
sent 147 request-for-assistance letters to private sector partners.

COMPANY A: 44 Letters
COMPANY B: 44 Letters
COMPANY C: 46 Letters
COMPANY D: 11 Letters
COMPANY E: 2 Letters

F) 2001. In his first PSP-related letter on 16 October 2001
to COMPANIES A, and C, General Hayden stated that the National
Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation required their
assistance "to collect intelligence vital to the national security arising from
the events of 11 September 2001," and specifically requested that they
"provide survey, tasking and collection against international traffic, some
of which terminates in the United States; provide aggregated call record
information; and supply computer to computer data which can be used to
determine the communicants." Their assistance was "needed to identify
members of intemational terrorist cells in the United States and prevent
future terrorist attacks against the United States." These first letters also
stated that the requested assistance was authorized by the President with
the legal concurrence of the Attorney General, pursuant to Article II of the
Constitution.

2002: Subsequent letters were sent to COMPANIES A,
B, and by General Hayden (or his deputy) each time the President
reauthorized the PSP. Throughout 2002, these written requests for
assistance referenced the 16 October letter; repeated the need to provide
the Presidentially-authorized assistance; emphasized that such assistance
was necessary to counter a fiiture terrorist attack; and stated that such
assistance was reviewed by the Attomey General and had been determined
to be a lawful exercise of the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief.
Starting in mid-2003, the wording of the letters was revised but in
substance remained the same.

Two request letters for assistance were sent to private
sector COMPANY E. The first letter was sent on 26 February 2002, and the last letter was sent on 14 March 2002. All letters were signed by
General Hayden.

F) In addition to the letters sent to COMPANY A,
COMPANY B, COMPANY and COMPANY E, eleven request letters for
assistance were prepared for intemet provider COMPANY D. The first
letter was on 9 October 2002 and the last letter was 11 September 2003.
All letters were signed by General Hayden or his designee.

2003: In June 2003, COMPANY Us General Counsel
and Chief of Stafi requested a written Attorney General opinion on the
legality and lawfulness of the PSP, to include a directive to comply.
COMPANY cited corporate liability concerns as their reason. On 8
August 2003, the Attorney General sent a letter stating that
the request for support was a lawful exercise of authorities assigned to the
President under Article II of the Constitution. Additionally, the Attorney
General directed COMPANY to comply with NSA's request.

F) 2004: On 26 March 2004, the President amended his 11
March 2004 authorization after deciding to discontinue bulk collection of
Intemet metadata. Before ll March 2004, all authorizations covering
Internet metadata collection (as well as content collection and telephony
metadata collection) were approved for form and legality by the Attorney
General. Accordingly, NSA's 12 March 2004 letters to the companies
stated that the most recent authorization had been approved for form and
legality by the Counsel to the President, not the Attomey General as with
previous authorizations.

2005: Beginning 19 September 2005 through 14
December 2006, new Director General Alexander, or his
designee, signed the request letters to the companies.

2006 Attorney General Letters. On 24 January 2006,
the Attomey General sent letters to COMPANIES A, B, and C, certifying
under 18 U.S.C. 251 that "no warrant or court order was or is
required by law for the assistance, that all statutory requirements have been
met, and that the assistance has been and is required."

F) 2006 DNI Letters. On 13 April 2006, the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) sent letters to Companies A, B, and to
underscore the continuing critical importance of their assistance. The DNI
letter also stated that the "intelligence obtained from their assistance has
been and continues to be indispensable to protecting the country and the
American people from terrorist attacks."

F) Letters for COMPANIES A, B, C, and were couriered
to the companies' local facility. COMPANY sometimes picked up its
letters at NSA Headquarters. Letters for COMPANY were stored at NSA
since no one at the company had the proper clearance to store them.

PSPAuthorized'Support to NSA

F) Private sector companies provided assistance to NSA
under the PSP in three categories: telephone and Intemet Protocol content,
Metadata from Call Detail Records, and Intemet Protocol Metadata.

F) The PSP allowed content to be collected if the selected
communication was one-end foreign or the location of the communicants
could not be determined. Selectors (email addresses and telephone
numbers) were provided by NSA's Office of Counterterrorism.

Content: Telephony. Under the PSP, companies
provided the content of one-end-foreign intemational telephone calls
(telephony content) and the content of electronic communications (email
content) of al Qaeda and its affiliates. COMPANIES A, B, and provided
telephony content from communications links they owned and operated.
They had been providing telephony content to NSA before 2001 under
FISA and E.O. 12333 authorities. NSA began to receive telephony content
from COMPANIES A and on 6 October 2001 and COMPANY on 7
October 2001. This support ended on 17 January 2007.

Content: Internet Email. COMPANIES A, B, and
provided access to the content of Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda--afi'iliate email
from communication links they owned and operated. NSA received email
content from COMPANY A as early as October 2001 until 17 January
2007, from Company beginning February-March 2002 through 17
January 2007, and from COMPANY from April 2005 until 17 Januaiy
2007. From April 2003 through November 2003, COMPANY provided
a limited amount of email content under the PSP. It did not provide PSP-
related support after November 2003, but it did provide support under
FISA.

F) Metadata from Call Detail Records. COMPANIES A
and provided Call Detail Records to NSA. The records were used by
NSA Counter-Terrorism metadata to perform call chaining and
network reconstruction between known al Qaeda and al Qaeda-affiliate
telephone numbers and previously unknown telephone numbers with which
they had been in contact. Providers generated Call Detail Records as a
normal course of doing business billing purposes and traffic

engineering). Records included all call events from the companies' long
distance and intemational communication networks. The Call Detail
Records were aggregated as large files by TS/SCI-cleared groups at
COMPANY A and COMPANY and forwarded, on an hourly or daily
basis, across classified communications circuits to a PSP-restricted NSA
data repository.

COMPANY A provided PSP-authorized CDRs as early as November 2001,
and COMPANY began to provide CDRs in February 2002. Both
continued to provide this support through the end of the PSP, and support
continues today under the FISC Business Records Order. COMPANY
provided select PSP-authorized CDRS from December 2002 through March
2003.

F) Internet Metadata. The last category of private sector
assistance was access to Intemet Protocol (IP) metadata associated with
communications of al Qaeda (and affiliates) from data links owned or
operated by COMPANIES A, B, and C. In order to be a candidate for PSP
IP metadata collection, data links were first vetted to ensure that the
preponderance of communications was from foreign sources, and that there
was a high probability of collecting al Qaeda (and affiliate)
communications. NSA took great care to ensure that metadata was
produced against foreign, not domestic, communications.

F) COMPANY A began providing PSP IP metadata
collection as early as November 2001. Although COMPANY began
providing CD-ROMS of PSP IP metadata in October 2001, an automated
transfer of data was not available until February-March 2002. The
Presidential authority to collect IP metadata was terminated in March 2004.
COMPANY A and COMPANY IP metadata collection resumed after the
FISC Pen Register/Trap Trace Order authorizing this activity
was signed on 15 July 2004. COMPANY provided IP metadata
beginning in April 2005.

(U) FIVE: INTERACTION WITH THE FISC AND
TRANSITION TO COURT ORDERS

Until 2006, N8A's PSP-related interaction with members of
the FISC was limited to informational briefings to the Chief Judge. Chief
Judge Royce Lamberth, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, who replaced Judge
Lamberth as Chief Judge in May 2002, and one law clerk were the only
members of the FISC that NSA had briefed on the PSP In the spring of
2004, NSA's interaction with Judge Kollar- Kotelly increased as NSA and
began transitioning PSP-authorized activities to FISC orders in 2004.
It was not until after parts of the PSP were publicly revealed in

December 2005 that all members of the FISC were briefed on the
Program.

(U) NSA's Interaction with the FISC

General Hayden stated that from the start of the PSP, he and
other NSA leaders recognized the importance of keeping all three branches
of the Govemment informed of the Program and pressed the White House
to do so.

In all of its interactions, neither NSA nor Do] presented
before the FISC the factual and legal issues arising from the PSP in any
case or controversy. Therefore, the FISC did not express any View or
comment on the legality or illegality of the PSP.

NSA Briefings on the PSP to Members of the FISC

The White House first permitted NSA to brief the Chief Judge
of the FISC in January 2002. General Hayden stated that on 31 January
2002, he provided Judge Lamberth a very detailed PSP briefing, and the
Deputy Assistant Attomey General in the OLC explained the
Program's legality. General Hayden stated that this briefing was prompted
by a concern expressed by DOJ that PSP-derived information would be
used in ISA applications

On 17 May 2002, General Hayden briefed incoming Chief
Judge Kollar-Kotelly, with Judge Lamberth in attendance, on the PSP. In a

letter to the Counsel for Intelligence Policy dated 12 January 2005, Judge
Kollar-Kotelly stated that, on that date, she was also shown a short legal
memorandum, prepared by the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the
OLC, that set out a broad overview of the legal authority for
conducting the PSP. Judge Kollar-Kotelly added that she was allowed to
read the memorandum but not to retain it for study.

F) NSA records show that Judge Kollar-Kotelly was briefed
again on 12 August 2002 at the White House. Although we found no
documentation of the purpose of the meeting or topics discussed, Judge
Kollar-Kotelly stated in the January 2005 letter to the Counsel for
Intelligence Policy that, at her request, she was permitted to review the
Authorization of the PSP on that date.

In response to a New York Times "warrantless wiretapping"
story published in December 2005, General Alexander briefed all FISC
members on the PSP on 9 January 2006.9

(U) Transition of PSP Authorities to FISC Orders

The transition of PSP-authorized activities to FISC orders
was precipitated by preliminary results of OLC legal review of the
components of the Program. In March 2004, OLC found three of the four
types of collection authorized under the PSP to be legally supportable.
However, it determined that, given the method of collection, bulk Intemet
metadata was prohibited by the terms of FISA and Title
Consequently, the White House Counsel rather than the Attorney General
signed the 11 March 2004 Authorization.

NSA Implements Controversial



9 Scullin did not attend this briefing, but was later briefed on 31 January 2006.
Judge Bates, a new judge, was briefed on 21 March 2006.

OLC ultimately issued three opinions: 15 March 2004, 6 May 2004, and 16 July
2004.

Until March 2004, NSA considered its
collection of bulk Internet metadata under the PSP to be
legal and appropriate. Specifically, NSA leadership,
including OGC lawyers and the IG, interpreted the terms of
the Authorization to allow NSA to obtain bulk Internet
metadata for analysis because NSA did not actually
"acquire" communications until specific communications
were selected. In other words, because the Authorization
permitted NSA to conduct metadata analysis on selectors
that met certain criteria, it implicitly authorized NSA to
obtain the bulk data that was needed to conduct the
metadata analysis.

On 11 March 2004, General Hayden had to
decide whether NSA would execute the Authorization
without the Attorney General's signature
General Hayden described a conversation in which David
Addington asked, you do it At that time,
General Hayden also said that he asked Daniel Levin,
Counsel to the Attorney General, in March 2004 if he
needed to stop anything he was doing. Mr Levin said that
he did not need to stop anything and lV-A/32a-
After conferring with NSA operational and legal
personnel, General Hayden stated that he decided to
continue the PSP because 1) the members of Congress he
briefed the previous day, 10 March, were supportive of
continuing the Program, 2) he knew the value of the
Program, and 3) NSA lawyers had determined the Program
was legal.



Eight days later on 19 March 2004, the President rescinded the
authority to collect bulk Intemet metadata and gave NSA one week to stop
collection and block access to previously collected bulk Intemet metadata. NSA
did so on 26 March 2004. To close the resulting collection gap, Do] and NSA
immediately began efforts to recreate this authority in what became the
order. By January 2007, the remaining three authorities had also been replicated in
FISC orders: the Business Records (BR) Order, the Foreign Content Order, and the

Domestic Content Order. On 1 February 2007, the final Authorization was allowed
to expire and was not renewed.

Transition of Internet Metadata Collection to Pen Register/T rap
and Trace Order Authority

F) According to NSA personnel, the decision to transition
Internet metadata collection to a FISC order was driven by At a
meeting on 26 March 2007, directed NSA representatives from OGC
and SID to find a legal basis, using a FISC order, to recreate NSA's PSP
authority to collect bulk Internet metadata.

F) After extensive coordination, and NSA devised the
theory to which the Chief Judge of the FISC seemed amenable.
and NSA worked closely over the following months, exchanging
drafts of the application, preparing declarations, and responding to
questions from court advisers. NSA representatives explained the
capabilities that were needed to recreate the Authority, and personnel
devised a workable legal basis to meet those needs. In April 2004, NSA
briefed Judge Kollar--Kotelly and a law clerk because Judge Kollar--Kotelly
was researching the impact of using PSP-derived information in FISA
applications. In May 2004, NSA personnel provided a technical briefing
on NSA collection of bulk Internet metadata to Judge Kollar--Kotelly. In
addition, General Hayden said he met with Judge Kollar--Kotelly on two
successive Saturdays during the summer of 2004 to discuss the on-going
efforts.

The ISC signed the first order on 14 July 2004.
Although NSA lost access to the bulk metadata from 26 March 2004 until
the order was signed, the order essentially gave NSA the same authority to
collect bulk Intemet metadata that it had under the PSP, except that it
specified the datalinks from which NSA could collect, and it limited the
number of people that could access the data. The FISC continues to renew
the approximately every 90 days.

Transition of Telephony Metadata Collection to the Business
Records Order

According to NSA General Counsel Vito Potenza, the
decision to transition telephony metadata to the Business Records Order
was driven by a private sector company. After the New York Times article
was published in December 2005, Mr. Potenza stated that one of the PSP
providers expressed concem about providing telephony metadata to NSA
under Presidential Authority without being compelled. Although OLC's

May 2004 opinion states that NSA collection of telephony metadata as
business records under the Authorization was legally supportable, the
provider preferred to be compelled to do so by a court order."

As with the Order, Do] and NSA collaboratively
designed the application, prepared declarations, and responded to questions
from court advisers. Their previous experience in drafting the PRTT Order
made this process more efficient.

The ISC signed the first Business Records Order on 24 May
2006. The order essentially gave NSA the same authority to collect bulk
telephony metadata from business records that it had under the PSP. And,
unlike the PRTT, there was no break in collection at transition. The order
did, however, limit the number of people that could access the data and
required more stringent oversight by and reporting to DOJ. The FISC
continues to renew the Business Records Order every 90 days or so. (See
Appendix H.)

Transition of Internet and Telephony Content Collection to the
Foreign and Domestic Content Orders

According to NSA OGC, the transition of PSP content
collection to FISC orders was driven by had contemplated a
transition in July 2004 when the FISC's signing of the order
indicated its willingness to authorize PSP activities under court order.
Given this precedent, concluded the FISC might also accept content
collection. However, little progress was made until June 2005 when the
OIPR with NSA OGC and SID representatives began researching the
feasibility of collecting PSP content under court order. In essence, DOJ
and NSA needed to find a legal theory that would allow NSA to add and
drop thousands of foreign targets for content collection. Because the law
was more restrictive for content than metadata, NSA had serious
reservations about whether it would be possible to find a workable solution
using a FISC order at that time, especially given the large number of
selectors to be tasked and the complexity from legal and operational
perspectives. For example:

In addition to the telephony metdata that NSA was receiving from private sector
companies as business records, it was also obtaining "live" telephony metadata from its own SIGINT
collection sources. It continued until mid-2005. will include a reference to the corresponding

notification here.**

NSA risked losing flexibility in the means of
collection, given that facilities and collection accesses were
complex and in constant flux.

In executing the and Business Records Orders,
the FISC's and DoJ's consistently increasing demands for
information took NSA away from target-related duties.

F) The process imposed by the FISA statute was not able
to handle the large volume of NSA requests for FISC authorization
needed after
11 September 2001.

Because OLC's May 2004 opinion found that the
existing Authorization for content collection was lawful, there was
no pressing need to find an alternative legal vehicle.

In a letter dated 21 February 2006, the NSA GC expressed the
aforementioned concems, among others, to the Acting Assistant Attorney
General suggesting that:

. . . . now might be the right time to seek substantial revisions to
the FISA. The purpose of the legislation was to protect the
privacy of U.S. persons who could be subjected to surveillance,
either intentionally or incidentally. Twenty-seven years later, the
United States Government finds itself obtaining ISA orders so
that it can cany out surveillance on foreign intelligence targets
who are outside the United States and, more ofien than not,
communicating only with others outside the United States. This
serves no U.S. person's privacy interests, was never anticipated by
the statute's drafters, and diverts valuable resources from the fight
against terrorism. The FISA needs to be simplified and
streamlined."

F) Ultimately, Do] decided to pursue a FISC order for content
collection wherein the traditional FISA definition of a "facility" as a
specific telephone number or email address was changed to encompass the
gateway or cable head that foreign targets use for communications.
Minimization and probable cause standards would then be applied. As
with the PRTT and Business Records orders, NSA collaborated with Do] to
prepare the application and declarations and provided the operational
requirements needed to continue effective surveillance.

After 18 months of concerted effort and coordination, the
FISC ultimately accepted the theory for foreign selectors but rejected it for

domestic selectors. Consequently, on 10 January 2007, the FISC signed
two separate orders: the Foreign Content Order and the Domestic Content
Order.

The Foreign Content Order negatively affected SIGINT
exploitation. Most notably, the number of foreign selectors on collection
dropped by 73 percent, from 11,000 selectors under PSP to 3,000 under the
order. In addition, the administrative workload for NSA to put
critical foreign selectors on collection was so burdensome that the order
became operationally unsustainable. The order was eventually superseded
by Congress' FISA modernization. It was temporarily replaced by the
Protect America Act in August 2007 and then permanently replaced by the
FISA Amendments Act in July 2008.

F) The Domestic Content Order did not create a similar loss in
collection because so few domestic numbers were tasked at that time. It
did, however, slow operations because of the documentation required, and
it took considerably longer to task under the order than under the PSP.
Over time, the scope of the Domestic Content Order gradually decreased to
a single selector tasked for collection in January 2009. In January 2009,
the FBI, at NSA's request, assumed responsibility for the Domestic Content
Order and became the declarant before the FISC.

(U) SIX: NSA OVERSIGHT OF PSP SIGINT ACTIVITIES

NSA Office of General Counsel and SID, Oversight and
Compliance provided oversight of NSA PSP activities from October 2001
until January 2007. NSA OIG initiated PSP oversight in 2002.

(U) Office of General Counsel

The OGC was the first NSA organization with oversight
responsibilities to leam of the PSP, and it continued to provide significant
oversight over the life of the Program. The GC was briefed on 4 October
2001, the day the Authorization was signed. On 6 October, he gave the
Director and Deputy Director talking points for briefing NSA personnel on
the new authority. The talking points included the fact that General
Hayden had instructed the GC and the lead attomey for operations to
conduct routine review and oversight of PSP activities.

The NSA Assistant General Counsel for Operations provided
most of the Program oversight before the OIG learned of the PSP in 2002.
He and his successors reviewed proposed target packages and rejected
those not compliant with the Authorization, answered questions, gave
briefings, reviewed program implementation, and coordinated program-
related issues with Do].

(U) SIGINT Directorate

The SIGINT Directorate Office of Oversight and Compliance
represents the Director and the Signals Intelligence
Director in overseeing compliance with authorities that govern the
collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence by the National
Security Agency. The Chief of was briefed on the PSP on 10
October 2001. Initially, ability to provide effective oversight was
limited by insufficient staffing and a lack of methodologies to provide
meaningful oversight of PSP collection. It, therefore, focused on
identifying problem areas while documenting program activity. It also
helped establish database partitions and assisted with data flow compliance
issues to prevent uncleared personnel from seeing Presidentially-authorized
collection. Later, it reviewed justification statements for tasked selectors.
Also, it directed PSP-cleared SIGINT operations personnel to follow


established procedures for the dissemination of U.S. person information
and obtained approvals to permit dissemination of U.S. person information

(U) Office of Inspector General

NSA OIG conducted oversight of PSP activities from August
2002 until the Program ended in January 2007. It issued 12 formal reports
and 14 Presidential Notifications on PSP activities at NSA.

Investigations were conducted in response to specific incidents or
violations to determine the cause, effect, and remedy.

Reviews were conducted to determine the adequacy of management
controls to ensure compliance with the Authorization and related
authorities; to assess the efficiency and effectiveness in mitigating
high-risk activities associated with the Program; and to identify
impediments to satisfying the requirements of the Authorization and
related authorities.

Presidential Notifications were drafted for the Director's signature
to notify the President's Counsel about violations of the
Authorization. (See below for additional details.)

Due Diligence Meetings were held by program officials
to exercise "due diligence" in addressing program issues and
developments. The OIG attended these meetings to stay aware of
program activities.

OIG also provided oversight of FISC-authorized activity
previously conducted under Authorization.

See Appendix for a list of OIG reports on PSP activity at
NSA.

(U) NSA IG Not Cleared until 2002

We could not determine exact reasons for
why the NSA lG was not cleared for the PSP until
August 2002. According to the NSA General Counsel,
the President would not allow the IG to be briefed
sooner. General Hayden did not specifically recall why
the IG was not brought in earlier, but thought that it
had not been appropriate to do so when it was
uncertain how long the Program would last and before
operations had stabilized. The NSA IG pointed out
that he did not take the IG position until April 2002, so
NSA leadership or the White House may have been
resistant to clearing either a new or an acting lG.

Regardless, by August 2002, General
Hayden and the NSA General Counsel wanted to
institutionalize oversight of the Program by bringing in
the IG. General Hayden recalled having to "make a
case" to the White House to clear the IG at that time.



OIG concerns lead to change

(C) In addition to formal recommendations made in review and
investigative reports, OIG concems about access to the terms of the
Presidential authorization and about the means of reporting PSP violations
resulted in three major changes.

(C) First, in December 2002, the IG recommended that General Hayden
formally delegate authority to NSA operational personnel, some of whom
had unknowingly violated tenns of the Authorization. The Counsel to the
Vice President, demanding secrecy, refused to let them see terms of the
authority, which had been delegated by the President to the Secretary of
Defense, who delegated it to the Director of NSA. General Hayden issued
the first "Delegation of Authority" letter to key operational personnel in the
SID on 4 March 2003. Subsequent delegation letters were issued each time
the President renewed the authority.

(C) Second, in March 2003, the IG advised General Hayden that he should
report violations of the Authorization to the President. In February of
2003, the OIG leamed of PSP incidents or violations that had not been
reported to overseers as required, because none had the clearance to see the
report.

Before March 2003, NSA quarterly reports on
intelligence activities sent to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board
(through the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Oversight) stated that the Director was not aware of any unlawful
surveillance activities by NSA other than that described in the report.
Beginning in March 2003, at the IG's direction, NSA quarterly reports
stated that except as disclosed to the President, the Director was not aware
of any unlawful surveillance activities by NSA. Also beginning in March
2003, PSP violations, including those not previously reported to the
Intelligence Oversight Board, were reported in "Presidential Notifications."

Third, shortly after leaming about the Program, the IG
participated in a September 2002 meeting of key cleared personnel at
which important PSP matters were discussed. He recommended that these
types of meetings be held every month. As a result, "due
diligence" meetings were held until the Program ended.