PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Alcibiades, Socrates.

SOCRATES
I dare say that you may be surprised to find, O son of Cleinias, that I, who am your first lover, not having spoken to you for many years, when the rest of the world were wearying you with their attentions, am the last of your lovers who still speaks to you. The cause of my silence has been that I was hindered by a power more than human, of which I will some day explain to you the nature; this impediment has now been removed; I therefore here present myself before you, and I greatly hope that no similar hindrance will again occur. Meanwhile, I have observed that your pride has been too much for the pride of your admirers; they were numerous and high-spirited, but they have all run away, overpowered by your superior force of character; not one of them remains. And I want you to understand the reason why you have been too much for them. You think that you have no need of them or of any other man, for you have great possessions and lack nothing, beginning with the body, and ending with the soul. In the first place, you say to yourself that you are the fairest and tallest of the citizens, and this every one who has eyes may see to be true; in the second place, that you are among the noblest of them, highly connected both on the father's and the mother's side, and sprung from one of the most distinguished families in your own state, which is the greatest in Hellas, and having many friends and kinsmen of the best sort, who can assist you when in need; and there is one potent relative, who is more to you than all the rest, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, whom your father left guardian of you, and of your brother, and who can do as he pleases not only in this city, but in all Hellas, and among many and mighty barbarous nations. Moreover, you are rich; but I must say that you value yourself least of all upon your possessions. And all these things have lifted you up; you have overcome your lovers, and they have acknowledged that you were too much for them. Have you not remarked their absence? And now I know that you wonder why I, unlike the rest of them, have not gone away, and what can be my motive in remaining.

ALCIBIADES
Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just going to ask you the very same question—What do you want? And what is your motive in annoying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point of coming? (Compare Symp.) I do really wonder what you mean, and should greatly like to know.

SOCRATES
Then if, as you say, you desire to know, I suppose that you will be willing to hear, and I may consider myself to be speaking to an auditor who will remain, and will not run away?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly, let me hear.

SOCRATES
You had better be careful, for I may very likely be as unwilling to end as I have hitherto been to begin.

ALCIBIADES
Proceed, my good man, and I will listen.

SOCRATES
I will proceed; and, although no lover likes to speak with one who has no feeling of love in him (compare Symp.), I will make an effort, and tell you what I meant: My love, Alcibiades, which I hardly like to confess, would long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself, if I saw you loving your good things, or thinking that you ought to pass life in the enjoyment of them. But I shall reveal other thoughts of yours, which you keep to yourself; whereby you will know that I have always had my eye on you. Suppose that at this moment some God came to you and said: Alcibiades, will you live as you are, or die in an instant if you are forbidden to make any further acquisition?—I verily believe that you would choose death. And I will tell you the hope in which you are at present living: Before many days have elapsed, you think that you will come before the Athenian assembly, and will prove to them that you are more worthy of honour than Pericles, or any other man that ever lived, and having proved this, you will have the greatest power in the state. When you have gained the greatest power among us, you will go on to other Hellenic states, and not only to Hellenes, but to all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if the God were then to say to you again: Here in Europe is to be your seat of empire, and you must not cross over into Asia or meddle with Asiatic affairs, I do not believe that you would choose to live upon these terms; but the world, as I may say, must be filled with your power and name—no man less than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account with you. Such I know to be your hopes—I am not guessing only—and very likely you, who know that I am speaking the truth, will reply, Well, Socrates, but what have my hopes to do with the explanation which you promised of your unwillingness to leave me? And that is what I am now going to tell you, sweet son of Cleinias and Dinomache. The explanation is, that all these designs of yours cannot be accomplished by you without my help; so great is the power which I believe myself to have over you and your concerns; and this I conceive to be the reason why the God has hitherto forbidden me to converse with you, and I have been long expecting his permission. For, as you hope to prove your own great value to the state, and having proved it, to attain at once to absolute power, so do I indulge a hope that I shall be the supreme power over you, if I am able to prove my own great value to you, and to show you that neither guardian, nor kinsman, nor any one is able to deliver into your hands the power which you desire, but I only, God being my helper. When you were young (compare Symp.) and your hopes were not yet matured, I should have wasted my time, and therefore, as I conceive, the God forbade me to converse with you; but now, having his permission, I will speak, for now you will listen to me.

ALCIBIADES
Your silence, Socrates, was always a surprise to me. I never could understand why you followed me about, and now that you have begun to speak again, I am still more amazed. Whether I think all this or not, is a matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, and therefore my denial will have no effect upon you. But granting, if I must, that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your assistance necessary to the attainment of them? Can you tell me why?
SOCRATES
You want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as you are in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way. I think, however, that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grant me one little favour.

ALCIBIADES
Yes, if the favour which you mean be not a troublesome one.

SOCRATES
Will you be troubled at having questions to answer?

ALCIBIADES
Not at all.

SOCRATES
Then please to answer.

ALCIBIADES
Ask me.

SOCRATES
Have you not the intention which I attribute to you?

ALCIBIADES
I will grant anything you like, in the hope of hearing what more you have to say.

SOCRATES
You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And suppose that when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve and say, Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians—do you know the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than they?—How would you answer?
ALCIBIADES
I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a matter which I do know better than they.

SOCRATES
Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or found out yourself?

ALCIBIADES
That is all.

SOCRATES
And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself?

ALCIBIADES
I should not.

SOCRATES
And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you supposed that you knew?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly not.
SOCRATES
Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know what you are now supposed to know?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according to my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the lyre, and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum of your accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in secret; and I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not have come out of your door, either by day or night, without my seeing you.

ALCIBIADES
Yes, that was the whole of my schooling.

SOCRATES
And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give them advice about writing?

ALCIBIADES
No, indeed.

SOCRATES
Or about the touch of the lyre?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly not.

SOCRATES
And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, in the assembly?

ALCIBIADES
Hardly.

SOCRATES
Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise them? Surely not about building?

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
For the builder will advise better than you will about that?

ALCIBIADES
He will.

SOCRATES
Nor about divination?

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
About that again the diviner will advise better than you will?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble or ignoble—makes no difference.

ALCIBIADES
Certainly not.

SOCRATES
A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has riches, but because he has knowledge?

ALCIBIADES
Assuredly.

SOCRATES
Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matter which will make any difference to the Athenians when they are deliberating about the health of the citizens; they only require that he should be a physician.

ALCIBIADES
Of course.

SOCRATES
Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you will be justified in getting up and advising them?

ALCIBIADES
About their own concerns, Socrates.

SOCRATES
You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is what sort of ships they ought to build?

ALCIBIADES
No, I should not advise them about that.

SOCRATES
I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:—is that the reason?

ALCIBIADES
It is.

SOCRATES
Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them?

ALCIBIADES
About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any other concerns of the state.

SOCRATES
You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better to go to war?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And when it is better?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
And for as long a time as is better?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought to close in wrestling, and whom they should grasp by the hand, would you, or the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly, the master of gymnastics.

SOCRATES
And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and how? To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with those against whom it is best to wrestle?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And as much as is best?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
And at such times as are best?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and dance?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
When it is well to do so?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And as much as is well?

ALCIBIADES: Just so.

SOCRATES
And as you speak of an excellence or art of the best in wrestling, and of an excellence in playing the lyre, I wish you would tell me what this latter is;—the excellence of wrestling I call gymnastic, and I want to know what you call the other.

ALCIBIADES
I do not understand you.

SOCRATES
Then try to do as I do; for the answer which I gave is universally right, and when I say right, I mean according to rule.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic?

ALCIBIADES
You did.

SOCRATES
And I was right?

ALCIBIADES
I think that you were.

SOCRATES
Well, now,—for you should learn to argue prettily—let me ask you in return to tell me, first, what is that art of which playing and singing, and stepping properly in the dance, are parts,—what is the name of the whole? I think that by this time you must be able to tell.

ALCIBIADES
Indeed I cannot.

SOCRATES
Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call the Goddesses who are the patronesses of art?

ALCIBIADES
The Muses do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES
Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is called after them?

ALCIBIADES
I suppose that you mean music.

SOCRATES
Yes, that is my meaning; and what is the excellence of the art of music, as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling was gymnastic—what is the excellence of music—to be what?

ALCIBIADES
To be musical, I suppose.

SOCRATES
Very good; and now please to tell me what is the excellence of war and peace; as the more musical was the more excellent, or the more gymnastical was the more excellent, tell me, what name do you give to the more excellent in war and peace?

ALCIBIADES
But I really cannot tell you.

SOCRATES
But if you were offering advice to another and said to him—This food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity, and he said to you—What do you mean, Alcibiades, by the word 'better'? you would have no difficulty in replying that you meant 'more wholesome,' although you do not profess to be a physician: and when the subject is one of which you profess to have knowledge, and about which you are ready to get up and advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed, when you are asked, not to be able to answer the question? Is it not disgraceful?

ALCIBIADES
Very.

SOCRATES
Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning of 'better,' in the matter of making peace and going to war with those against whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer?

ALCIBIADES
I am thinking, and I cannot tell.

SOCRATES
But you surely know what are the charges which we bring against one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what name we give them?

ALCIBIADES
Yes, certainly; we say that deceit or violence has been employed, or that we have been defrauded.

SOCRATES
And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there may be a difference in the manner.

ALCIBIADES
Do you mean by 'how,' Socrates, whether we suffered these things justly or unjustly?

SOCRATES
Exactly.

ALCIBIADES
There can be no greater difference than between just and unjust.

SOCRATES
And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or with the unjust?

ALCIBIADES
That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a person did intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were just.

SOCRATES
He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful?

ALCIBIADES
Neither lawful nor honourable.

SOCRATES
Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or ought not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly.

SOCRATES
But how is this, friend Alcibiades? Have you forgotten that you do not know this, or have you been to the schoolmaster without my knowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust? Who is he? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him—you shall introduce me.

ALCIBIADES
You are mocking, Socrates.

SOCRATES
No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the God of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am not; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists.

ALCIBIADES
But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the knowledge of just and unjust in some other way?

SOCRATES
Yes; if you have discovered them.

ALCIBIADES
But do you not think that I could discover them?

SOCRATES
I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them.

ALCIBIADES
And do you not think that I would enquire?

SOCRATES
Yes; if you thought that you did not know them.

ALCIBIADES
And was there not a time when I did so think?

SOCRATES
Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you thought that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust? What do you say to a year ago? Were you then in a state of conscious ignorance and enquiry? Or did you think that you knew? And please to answer truly, that our discussion may not be in vain.

ALCIBIADES
Well, I thought that I knew.

SOCRATES
And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you knew all the same?

ALCIBIADES
I did.

SOCRATES
And more than four years ago you were a child—were you not?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew.

ALCIBIADES
Why are you so sure?

SOCRATES
Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher's house, or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys, not hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but very confident—crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a cheat, and had been cheating. Is it not true?

ALCIBIADES
But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me?

SOCRATES
And how can you say, 'What was I to do'? if at the time you did not know whether you were wronged or not?

ALCIBIADES
To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was being cheated.

SOCRATES
Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the nature of just and unjust?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly; and I did know then.

SOCRATES
And when did you discover them—not, surely, at the time when you thought that you knew them?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly not.

SOCRATES
And when did you think that you were ignorant—if you consider, you will find that there never was such a time?

ALCIBIADES
Really, Socrates, I cannot say.

SOCRATES
Then you did not learn them by discovering them?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly not.

SOCRATES
But just before you said that you did not know them by learning; now, if you have neither discovered nor learned them, how and whence do you come to know them?

ALCIBIADES
I suppose that I was mistaken in saying that I knew them through my own discovery of them; whereas, in truth, I learned them in the same way that other people learn.

SOCRATES
So you said before, and I must again ask, of whom? Do tell me.

ALCIBIADES
Of the many.

SOCRATES
Do you take refuge in them? I cannot say much for your teachers.

ALCIBIADES
Why, are they not able to teach?

SOCRATES
They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you would acknowledge (would you not) to be a much smaller matter than justice?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the worse?

ALCIBIADES
I think that they can; at any rate, they can teach many far better things than to play at draughts.

SOCRATES
What things?

ALCIBIADES
Why, for example, I learned to speak Greek of them, and I cannot say who was my teacher, or to whom I am to attribute my knowledge of Greek, if not to those good-for-nothing teachers, as you call them.

SOCRATES
Why, yes, my friend; and the many are good enough teachers of Greek, and some of their instructions in that line may be justly praised.

ALCIBIADES
Why is that?

SOCRATES
Why, because they have the qualities which good teachers ought to have.

ALCIBIADES
What qualities?

SOCRATES
Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any teacher?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
And if they know, they must agree together and not differ?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And would you say that they knew the things about which they differ?

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
Then how can they teach them?

ALCIBIADES
They cannot.

SOCRATES
Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the nature of wood and stone? are they not agreed if you ask them what they are? and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want a piece of wood or a stone? And so in similar cases, which I suspect to be pretty nearly all that you mean by speaking Greek.

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
These, as we were saying, are matters about which they are agreed with one another and with themselves; both individuals and states use the same words about them; they do not use some one word and some another.

ALCIBIADES
They do not.

SOCRATES
Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall be right in sending him to be taught by our friends the many?

ALCIBIADES
Very true.

SOCRATES
But if we wanted further to know not only which are men and which are horses, but which men or horses have powers of running, would the many still be able to inform us?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly not.

SOCRATES
And you have a sufficient proof that they do not know these things and are not the best teachers of them, inasmuch as they are never agreed about them?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like, but what healthy or diseased men are like—would the many be able to teach us?

ALCIBIADES
They would not.

SOCRATES
And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of these matters, if you saw them at variance?

ALCIBIADES
I should.

SOCRATES
Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with one another, about the justice or injustice of men and things?

ALCIBIADES
Assuredly not, Socrates.

SOCRATES
There is no subject about which they are more at variance?

ALCIBIADES
None.

SOCRATES
I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men quarrelling over the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go to war and kill one another for the sake of them?

ALCIBIADES
No indeed.

SOCRATES
But of the quarrels about justice and injustice, even if you have never seen them, you have certainly heard from many people, including Homer; for you have heard of the Iliad and Odyssey?

ALCIBIADES
To be sure, Socrates.

SOCRATES
A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those poems?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
Which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojans and Achaeans, and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrel with Odysseus.

ALCIBIADES
Very true.

SOCRATES
And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boeotians fell at Tanagra, and afterwards in the battle of Coronea, at which your father Cleinias met his end, the question was one of justice—this was the sole cause of the battles, and of their deaths.

ALCIBIADES
Very true.

SOCRATES
But can they be said to understand that about which they are quarrelling to the death?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly not.

SOCRATES
And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the teachers to whom you are appealing.

ALCIBIADES
Very true.

SOCRATES
But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and injustice, about which you are so perplexed, if you have neither learned them of others nor discovered them yourself?

ALCIBIADES
From what you say, I suppose not.

SOCRATES
See, again, how inaccurately you speak, Alcibiades!

ALCIBIADES
In what respect?

SOCRATES
In saying that I say so.

ALCIBIADES
Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and unjust?

SOCRATES
No; I did not.

ALCIBIADES
Did I, then?

SOCRATES
Yes.

ALCIBIADES
How was that?

SOCRATES
Let me explain. Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater number, two or one; you would reply 'two'?

ALCIBIADES
I should.

SOCRATES
And by how much greater?

ALCIBIADES
By one.

SOCRATES
Which of us now says that two is more than one?

ALCIBIADES
I do.

SOCRATES
Did not I ask, and you answer the question?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then who is speaking? I who put the question, or you who answer me?

ALCIBIADES
I am.

SOCRATES
Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker?

ALCIBIADES
I am.

SOCRATES
Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a question and answer, who is the speaker,—the questioner or the answerer?

ALCIBIADES
I should say, Socrates, that the answerer was the speaker.

SOCRATES
And have I not been the questioner all through?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And you the answerer?

ALCIBIADES
Just so.

SOCRATES
Which of us, then, was the speaker?

ALCIBIADES
The inference is, Socrates, that I was the speaker.

SOCRATES
Did not some one say that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, not understanding about just and unjust, but thinking that he did understand, was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about what he did not know? Was not that said?

ALCIBIADES
Very true.

SOCRATES
Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the language of Euripides. I think that you have heard all this 'from yourself, and not from me'; nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me, but you yourself, and what you said was very true. For indeed, my dear fellow, the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know, and have not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity.

ALCIBIADES
But, Socrates, I think that the Athenians and the rest of the Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust; for they see no difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and consider which course of action will be most expedient; for there is a difference between justice and expediency. Many persons have done great wrong and profited by their injustice; others have done rightly and come to no good.

SOCRATES
Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are ever so much opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient for mankind, or why a thing is expedient?

ALCIBIADES
Why not, Socrates?—But I am not going to be asked again from whom I learned, or when I made the discovery.

SOCRATES
What a way you have! When you make a mistake which might be refuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and different refutation; the old argument is a worn-our garment which you will no longer put on, but some one must produce another which is clean and new. Now I shall disregard this move of yours, and shall ask over again,—Where did you learn and how do you know the nature of the expedient, and who is your teacher? All this I comprehend in a single question, and now you will manifestly be in the old difficulty, and will not be able to show that you know the expedient, either because you learned or because you discovered it yourself. But, as I perceive that you are dainty, and dislike the taste of a stale argument, I will enquire no further into your knowledge of what is expedient or what is not expedient for the Athenian people, and simply request you to say why you do not explain whether justice and expediency are the same or different? And if you like you may examine me as I have examined you, or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by yourself.

ALCIBIADES
But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able to discuss the matter with you.

SOCRATES
Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus and the ecclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade men individually.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And is not the same person able to persuade one individual singly and many individuals of the things which he knows? The grammarian, for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many about letters.

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
And about number, will not the same person persuade one and persuade many?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician?

ALCIBIADES
Quite true.

SOCRATES
And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can persuade many?

ALCIBIADES
I suppose so.

SOCRATES
And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you know?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And the only difference between one who argues as we are doing, and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the one seeks to persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the same things.

ALCIBIADES
I suppose so.

SOCRATES
Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitude can persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me that the just is not always expedient.

ALCIBIADES
You take liberties, Socrates.

SOCRATES
I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of that which you will not prove to me.

ALCIBIADES: Proceed.

SOCRATES
Answer my questions—that is all.

ALCIBIADES
Nay, I should like you to be the speaker.

SOCRATES
What, do you not wish to be persuaded?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly I do.

SOCRATES
And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth?

ALCIBIADES
I think not.

SOCRATES
Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, that the just is the expedient, coming from your own lips, never believe another man again.

ALCIBIADES
I won't; but answer I will, for I do not see how I can come to any harm.

SOCRATES
A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And sometimes honourable and sometimes not?

ALCIBIADES
What do you mean?

SOCRATES
I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was dishonourable and yet just?

ALCIBIADES
Never.

SOCRATES
All just things are honourable?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not good, or are they always good?

ALCIBIADES
I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are evil.

SOCRATES
And are some dishonourable things good?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
You mean in such a case as the following:—In time of war, men have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, when others who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in safety?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable, in respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this is courage?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
But evil in respect of death and wounds?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and the death another?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then the rescue of one's friends is honourable in one point of view, but evil in another?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
And if honourable, then also good: Will you consider now whether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging that the courage which is shown in the rescue is honourable? Now is this courage good or evil? Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or evil?

ALCIBIADES
Good.

SOCRATES
And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and would least like to be deprived of them?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
What would you say of courage? At what price would you be willing to be deprived of courage?

ALCIBIADES
I would rather die than be a coward.

SOCRATES
Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils?

ALCIBIADES
I do.

SOCRATES
As bad as death, I suppose?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And they are what you would most desire to have, and their opposites you would least desire?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death and cowardice the worst?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle honourable, in as much as courage does a good work?

ALCIBIADES
I should.

SOCRATES
But evil because of the death which ensues?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Might we not describe their different effects as follows:—You may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result, and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and dishonourable in so far as they are evil?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is honourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is good and yet evil?

ALCIBIADES
I believe that you are right, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor anything base, regarded as base, good.

ALCIBIADES
Clearly not.

SOCRATES
Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who acts honourably acts well?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And he who acts well is happy?

ALCIBIADES
Of course.

SOCRATES
And the happy are those who obtain good?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
And they obtain good by acting well and honourably?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then acting well is a good?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
And happiness is a good?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then the good and the honourable are again identified.

ALCIBIADES
Manifestly.

SOCRATES
Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we shall also find to be good?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
And is the good expedient or not?

ALCIBIADES
Expedient.

SOCRATES
Do you remember our admissions about the just?

ALCIBIADES
Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted justly must also act honourably.

SOCRATES
And the honourable is the good?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And the good is expedient?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient?

ALCIBIADES
I should infer so.

SOCRATES
And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you answer?

ALCIBIADES
I must acknowledge it to be true.

SOCRATES
And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the expedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule any one who, pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets up to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the just may be the evil?

ALCIBIADES
I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me I am of different minds in successive instants.

SOCRATES
And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my friend?

ALCIBIADES
Indeed I am not.

SOCRATES
Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you would then be of different minds in successive instants?

ALCIBIADES
I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that I should.

SOCRATES
You would feel no doubt; and for this reason—because you would know?

ALCIBIADES
I suppose so.

SOCRATES
And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant?

ALCIBIADES
Very likely.

SOCRATES
And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in perplexity. Is not that clear?

ALCIBIADES
I agree.

SOCRATES
But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly he is.

SOCRATES
And do you know how to ascend into heaven?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly not.

SOCRATES
And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed?

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you?

ALCIBIADES
Tell me.

SOCRATES
The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but you do not think that you know.

ALCIBIADES
There again; what do you mean?

SOCRATES
Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which you are ignorant? You know, for example, that you know nothing about the preparation of food.

ALCIBIADES
Very true.

SOCRATES
And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of food: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art?

ALCIBIADES
The latter.

SOCRATES
Or if you were on a voyage, would you bewilder yourself by considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing?

ALCIBIADES
It would be the concern of the pilot.

SOCRATES
Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know it?

ALCIBIADES
I imagine not.

SOCRATES
Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge?

ALCIBIADES
Once more, what do you mean?

SOCRATES
I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what we are doing?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
But when people think that they do not know, they entrust their business to others?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make mistakes in life, because they trust others about things of which they are ignorant?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? They cannot, of course, be those who know?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly not.

SOCRATES
But if neither those who know, nor those who know that they do not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know and think that they know.

ALCIBIADES
Yes, only those.

SOCRATES Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is mischievous?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with the greatest matters?

ALCIBIADES
By far.

SOCRATES
And can there be any matters greater than the just, the honourable, the good, and the expedient?

ALCIBIADES
There cannot be.

SOCRATES
And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has shown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being ignorant you fancy that you know them?

ALCIBIADES
I fear that you are right.

SOCRATES
And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly like to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: My good friend, you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and of this you are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by your own argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you are educated. Neither is your case to be deemed singular. For I might say the same of almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps of your guardian, Pericles.

ALCIBIADES
Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got his wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of the philosophers; with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras, and now in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom.

SOCRATES
Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who was unable to impart his particular wisdom? For example, he who taught you letters was not only wise, but he made you and any others whom he liked wise.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And you, whom he taught, can do the same?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
And in like manner the harper and gymnastic-master?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
When a person is enabled to impart knowledge to another, he thereby gives an excellent proof of his own understanding of any matter.

ALCIBIADES
I agree.

SOCRATES
Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by making his sons wise?

ALCIBIADES
But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what has that to do with the matter?

SOCRATES
Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise?

ALCIBIADES
Cleinias is a madman; there is no use in talking of him.

SOCRATES
But if Cleinias is a madman and the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what reason can be given why he neglects you, and lets you be as you are?

ALCIBIADES
I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him.

SOCRATES
But did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner, bond or free, who was deemed to have grown wiser in the society of Pericles,—as I might cite Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, and Callias, the son of Calliades, who have grown wiser in the society of Zeno, for which privilege they have each of them paid him the sum of a hundred minae (about 406 pounds sterling) to the increase of their wisdom and fame.

ALCIBIADES
I certainly never did hear of any one.

SOCRATES
Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain as you are, or will you take some pains about yourself?

ALCIBIADES
With your aid, Socrates, I will. And indeed, when I hear you speak, the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me, and I agree with you, for our statesmen, all but a few, do appear to be quite uneducated.

SOCRATES
What is the inference?

ALCIBIADES
Why, that if they were educated they would be trained athletes, and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledge and experience when he attacks them; but now, as they have become politicians without any special training, why should I have the trouble of learning and practising? For I know well that by the light of nature I shall get the better of them.

SOCRATES
My dear friend, what a sentiment! And how unworthy of your noble form and your high estate!

ALCIBIADES
What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so?

SOCRATES
I am grieved when I think of our mutual love.

ALCIBIADES
At what?

SOCRATES
At your fancying that the contest on which you are entering is with people here.

ALCIBIADES
Why, what others are there?

SOCRATES
Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask?

ALCIBIADES
Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these?

SOCRATES
And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, would you only aim at being the best pilot on board?
Would you not, while acknowledging that you must possess this degree of excellence, rather look to your antagonists, and not, as you are now doing, to your fellow combatants? You ought to be so far above these latter, that they will not even dare to be your rivals; and, being regarded by you as inferiors, will do battle for you against the enemy; this is the kind of superiority which you must establish over them, if you mean to accomplish any noble action really worthy of yourself and of the state.

ALCIBIADES
That would certainly be my aim.

SOCRATES
Verily, then, you have good reason to be satisfied, if you are better than the soldiers; and you need not, when you are their superior and have your thoughts and actions fixed upon them, look away to the generals of the enemy.

ALCIBIADES
Of whom are you speaking, Socrates?

SOCRATES
Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and then with the Lacedaemonians and with the great king?

ALCIBIADES
True enough.

SOCRATES
And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you not be right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian king were your true rivals?

ALCIBIADES
I believe that you are right.

SOCRATES
Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you ought rather to turn your attention to Midias the quail-breeder and others like him, who manage our politics; in whom, as the women would remark, you may still see the slaves' cut of hair, cropping out in their minds as well as on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo to flatter us and not to rule us. To these, I say, you should look, and then you need not trouble yourself about your own fitness to contend in such a noble arena: there is no reason why you should either learn what has to be learned, or practise what has to be practised, and only when thoroughly prepared enter on a political career.

ALCIBIADES
There, I think, Socrates, that you are right; I do not suppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are really different from anybody else.

SOCRATES
But, my dear friend, do consider what you are saying.

ALCIBIADES
What am I to consider?

SOCRATES
In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you are not?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly, if I have such a fear of them.

SOCRATES
And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take care of yourself?

ALCIBIADES
No, I shall be greatly benefited.

SOCRATES
And this is one very important respect in which that notion of yours is bad.

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
In the next place, consider that what you say is probably false.

ALCIBIADES
How so?

SOCRATES
Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found in noble races or not in noble races?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly in noble races.

SOCRATES
Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to be perfect in virtue?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent? Have we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and the latter from Achaemenes, and that the race of Heracles and the race of Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?

ALCIBIADES
Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus!

SOCRATES
And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and he to Hephaestus, son of Zeus. But, for all that, we are far inferior to them. For they are descended 'from Zeus,' through a line of kings—either kings of Argos and Lacedaemon, or kings of Persia, a country which the descendants of Achaemenes have always possessed, besides being at various times sovereigns of Asia, as they now are; whereas, we and our fathers were but private persons. How ridiculous would you be thought if you were to make a display of your ancestors and of Salamis the island of Eurysaces, or of Aegina, the habitation of the still more ancient Aeacus, before Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes. You should consider how inferior we are to them both in the derivation of our birth and in other particulars. Did you never observe how great is the property of the Spartan kings? And their wives are under the guardianship of the Ephori, who are public officers and watch over them, in order to preserve as far as possible the purity of the Heracleid blood. Still greater is the difference among the Persians; for no one entertains a suspicion that the father of a prince of Persia can be any one but the king. Such is the awe which invests the person of the queen, that any other guard is needless. And when the heir of the kingdom is born, all the subjects of the king feast; and the day of his birth is for ever afterwards kept as a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia; whereas, when you and I were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet says, the neighbours hardly knew of the important event. After the birth of the royal child, he is tended, not by a good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by the best of the royal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him, and especially with the fashioning and right formation of his limbs, in order that he may be as shapely as possible; which being their calling, they are held in great honour. And when the young prince is seven years old he is put upon a horse and taken to the riding-masters, and begins to go out hunting. And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the royal schoolmasters, as they are termed: these are four chosen men, reputed to be the best among the Persians of a certain age; and one of them is the wisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and a fourth the most valiant. The first instructs him in the magianism of Zoroaster, the son of Oromasus, which is the worship of the Gods, and teaches him also the duties of his royal office; the second, who is the justest, teaches him always to speak the truth; the third, or most temperate, forbids him to allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be accustomed to be a freeman and king indeed,—lord of himself first, and not a slave; the most valiant trains him to be bold and fearless, telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a slave; whereas Pericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a slave of his who was past all other work. I might enlarge on the nurture and education of your rivals, but that would be tedious; and what I have said is a sufficient sample of what remains to be said. I have only to remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares about your birth or nurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any other Athenian, unless he has a lover who looks after him. And if you cast an eye on the wealth, the luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, the anointings with myrrh, the multitudes of attendants, and all the other bravery of the Persians, you will be ashamed when you discern your own inferiority; or if you look at the temperance and orderliness and ease and grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toil and desire of glory and ambition of the Lacedaemonians—in all these respects you will see that you are but a child in comparison of them. Even in the matter of wealth, if you value yourself upon that, I must reveal to you how you stand; for if you form an estimate of the wealth of the Lacedaemonians, you will see that our possessions fall far short of theirs. For no one here can compete with them either in the extent and fertility of their own and the Messenian territory, or in the number of their slaves, and especially of the Helots, or of their horses, or of the animals which feed on the Messenian pastures. But I have said enough of this: and as to gold and silver, there is more of them in Lacedaemon than in all the rest of Hellas, for during many generations gold has been always flowing in to them from the whole Hellenic world, and often from the barbarian also, and never going out, as in the fable of Aesop the fox said to the lion, 'The prints of the feet of those going in are distinct enough;' but who ever saw the trace of money going out of Lacedaemon? And therefore you may safely infer that the inhabitants are the richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, and that their kings are the richest of them, for they have a larger share of these things, and they have also a tribute paid to them which is very considerable. Yet the Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the wealth of the other Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the Persians and their kings. Why, I have been informed by a credible person who went up to the king (at Susa), that he passed through a large tract of excellent land, extending for nearly a day's journey, which the people of the country called the queen's girdle, and another, which they called her veil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved for the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several habiliments. Now, I cannot help thinking to myself, What if some one were to go to Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and say to her, There is a certain Dinomache, whose whole wardrobe is not worth fifty minae—and that will be more than the value—and she has a son who is possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchiae, and he has a mind to go to war with your son—would she not wonder to what this Alcibiades trusts for success in the conflict? 'He must rely,' she would say to herself, 'upon his training and wisdom—these are the things which Hellenes value.' And if she heard that this Alcibiades who is making the attempt is not as yet twenty years old, and is wholly uneducated, and when his lover tells him that he ought to get education and training first, and then go and fight the king, he refuses, and says that he is well enough as he is, would she not be amazed, and ask 'On what, then, does the youth rely?' And if we replied: He relies on his beauty, and stature, and birth, and mental endowments, she would think that we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages which you possess with those of her own people. And I believe that even Lampido, the daughter of Leotychides, the wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, all of whom were kings, would have the same feeling; if, in your present uneducated state, you were to turn your thoughts against her son, she too would be equally astonished. But how disgraceful, that we should not have as high a notion of what is required in us as our enemies' wives and mothers have of the qualities which are required in their assailants! O my friend, be persuaded by me, and hear the Delphian inscription, 'Know thyself'—not the men whom you think, but these kings are our rivals, and we can only overcome them by pains and skill. And if you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in becoming renowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire more than any other man ever desired anything.

ALCIBIADES
I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which are required, Socrates,—can you tell me?

SOCRATES
Yes, I can; but we must take counsel together concerning the manner in which both of us may be most improved. For what I am telling you of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you; and there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you.

ALCIBIADES
What is that?

SOCRATES
I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian, Pericles.

ALCIBIADES
Who is he, Socrates?

SOCRATES
God, Alcibiades, who up to this day has not allowed me to converse with you; and he inspires in me the faith that I am especially designed to bring you to honour.

ALCIBIADES
You are jesting, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Perhaps, at any rate, I am right in saying that all men greatly need pains and care, and you and I above all men.

ALCIBIADES
You are not far wrong about me.

SOCRATES
And certainly not about myself.

ALCIBIADES
But what can we do?

SOCRATES
There must be no hesitation or cowardice, my friend.

ALCIBIADES
That would not become us, Socrates.

SOCRATES
No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we not wish to be as good as possible?

ALCIBIADES
We do.

SOCRATES
In what sort of virtue?

ALCIBIADES
Plainly, in the virtue of good men.

SOCRATES
Who are good in what?

ALCIBIADES
Those, clearly, who are good in the management of affairs.

SOCRATES
What sort of affairs? Equestrian affairs?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly not.

SOCRATES
You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Well, naval affairs?

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then what affairs? And who do them?

ALCIBIADES
The affairs which occupy Athenian gentlemen.

SOCRATES
And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the unwise?

ALCIBIADES
The wise.

SOCRATES
And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making of shoes?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then he is good in that?

ALCIBIADES
He is.

SOCRATES
But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then in that he is bad?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and also bad?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
But would you say that the good are the same as the bad?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly not.

SOCRATES
Then whom do you call the good?

ALCIBIADES
I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city.

SOCRATES
Not, surely, over horses?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly not.

SOCRATES
But over men?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
When they are sick?

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
Or on a voyage?

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
Or reaping the harvest?

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
When they are doing something or nothing?

ALCIBIADES
When they are doing something, I should say.

SOCRATES
I wish that you would explain to me what this something is.

ALCIBIADES
When they are having dealings with one another, and using one another's services, as we citizens do in our daily life.

SOCRATES
Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the services of other men?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Are they ruling over the signal-men who give the time to the rowers?

ALCIBIADES
No; they are not.

SOCRATES
That would be the office of the pilot?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute-players, who lead the singers and use the services of the dancers?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly not.

SOCRATES
That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who use other men?

ALCIBIADES
I mean that they rule over men who have common rights of citizenship, and dealings with one another.

SOCRATES
And what sort of an art is this? Suppose that I ask you again, as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their fellow-sailors,—how would you answer?

ALCIBIADES
The art of the pilot.

SOCRATES
And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables them to rule over their fellow-singers?

ALCIBIADES
The art of the teacher of the chorus, which you were just now mentioning.

SOCRATES
And what do you call the art of fellow-citizens?

ALCIBIADES
I should say, good counsel, Socrates.

SOCRATES
And is the art of the pilot evil counsel?

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
But good counsel?

ALCIBIADES
Yes, that is what I should say,—good counsel, of which the aim is the preservation of the voyagers.

SOCRATES
True. And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which you speak?

ALCIBIADES
The aim is the better order and preservation of the city.

SOCRATES
And what is that of which the absence or presence improves and preserves the order of the city? Suppose you were to ask me, what is that of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order of the body? I should reply, the presence of health and the absence of disease. You would say the same?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, I should reply in the same way, 'the presence of sight and the absence of blindness;' or about the ears, I should reply, that they were improved and were in better case, when deafness was absent, and hearing was present in them.

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
And what would you say of a state? What is that by the presence or absence of which the state is improved and better managed and ordered?

ALCIBIADES
I should say, Socrates:—the presence of friendship and the absence of hatred and division.

SOCRATES
And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement?

ALCIBIADES
Agreement.

SOCRATES
What art makes cities agree about numbers?

ALCIBIADES
Arithmetic.

SOCRATES
And private individuals?

ALCIBIADES
The same.

SOCRATES
And what art makes each individual agree with himself?

ALCIBIADES
The same.

SOCRATES
And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the comparative length of the span and of the cubit? Does not the art of measure?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Individuals are agreed with one another about this; and states, equally?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And the same holds of the balance?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and about what? what art can give that agreement? And does that which gives it to the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent with himself and with another?

ALCIBIADES
I should suppose so.

SOCRATES
But what is the nature of the agreement?—answer, and faint not.

ALCIBIADES
I mean to say that there should be such friendship and agreement as exists between an affectionate father and mother and their son, or between brothers, or between husband and wife.

SOCRATES
But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the spinning of wool, which she understands and he does not?

ALCIBIADES
No, truly.

SOCRATES
Nor has he any need, for spinning is a female accomplishment.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms, which she has never learned?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly not.

SOCRATES
I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a male accomplishment?

ALCIBIADES
It would.

SOCRATES
Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of knowledge?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and men?

ALCIBIADES
There is not.

SOCRATES
Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement?

ALCIBIADES
Plainly not.

SOCRATES
Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work?

ALCIBIADES
I suppose not.

SOCRATES
Nor men by women when they do their own work?

ALCIBIADES
No.

SOCRATES
Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their own work?

ALCIBIADES
I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is the truth. (Compare Republic.)

SOCRATES
What! do you mean to say that states are well administered when friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying, alone secures their good order?

ALCIBIADES
But I should say that there is friendship among them, for this very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work.

SOCRATES
That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? How can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of which the other is in ignorance?

ALCIBIADES
Impossible.

SOCRATES
And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing what is just or unjust?

ALCIBIADES
What is just, certainly.

SOCRATES
And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no friendship among them?

ALCIBIADES
I suppose that there must be, Socrates.

SOCRATES
Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men? I cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the same persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not.

ALCIBIADES
But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying; and I have long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state.

SOCRATES
Nevertheless, cheer up; at fifty, if you had discovered your deficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the discovery should be made.

ALCIBIADES
And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery?

SOCRATES
Answer questions, Alcibiades; and that is a process which, by the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very improving to both of us.

ALCIBIADES
If I can be improved by answering, I will answer.

SOCRATES
And first of all, that we may not peradventure be deceived by appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves when we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself? and when does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what belongs to him?

ALCIBIADES
I should think so.

SOCRATES
When does a man take care of his feet? Does he not take care of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet?

ALCIBIADES
I do not understand.

SOCRATES
Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring belong to the finger, and to the finger only?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And the shoe in like manner to the foot?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our feet?

ALCIBIADES
I do not comprehend, Socrates.

SOCRATES
But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a thing is a correct expression?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And taking proper care means improving?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And what is the art which improves our shoes?

ALCIBIADES
Shoemaking.

SOCRATES
Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES: And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some other art which improves the feet?

ALCIBIADES: By some other art.

SOCRATES
And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of the body?

ALCIBIADES
Very true.

SOCRATES
Which is gymnastic?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of that which belongs to our feet?

ALCIBIADES
Very true.

SOCRATES
And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of graving rings of that which belongs to our hands?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly.

SOCRATES
Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from that which takes care of the belongings of each thing?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care of yourself?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly not.

SOCRATES
For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be the same as that which takes care of ourselves?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly not.

SOCRATES
And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care of ourselves?

ALCIBIADES
I cannot say.

SOCRATES
At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves better?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we did not know a shoe?

ALCIBIADES
Impossible.

SOCRATES
Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not know a ring?

ALCIBIADES
That is true.

SOCRATES
And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not know what we are ourselves?

ALCIBIADES
Impossible.

SOCRATES
And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain?

ALCIBIADES: At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself; at other times the task appears to be very difficult.

SOCRATES
But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is no other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know.

ALCIBIADES
That is true.

SOCRATES
Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own existence, which otherwise we can never know.

ALCIBIADES
You say truly.

SOCRATES
Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are conversing?—with whom but with me?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
As I am, with you?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And Alcibiades is my hearer?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And I in talking use words?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning?

ALCIBIADES
To be sure.

SOCRATES
And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses?

ALCIBIADES
What do you mean?

SOCRATES
I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square tool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.

SOCRATES
But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool?

ALCIBIADES
Of course not.

SOCRATES
And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be distinguished from the harper himself?

ALCIBIADES
It is.

SOCRATES
Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user to be always different from that which he uses?
ALCIBIADES: I do.

SOCRATES
Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only or with his hands?

ALCIBIADES
With his hands as well.

SOCRATES
He uses his hands too?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And does he use his eyes in cutting leather?

ALCIBIADES
He does.

SOCRATES
And we admit that the user is not the same with the things which he uses?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from the hands and feet which they use?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly.

SOCRATES
And does not a man use the whole body?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
And that which uses is different from that which is used?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
Then a man is not the same as his own body?

ALCIBIADES
That is the inference.

SOCRATES
What is he, then?

ALCIBIADES
I cannot say.

SOCRATES
Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body.

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And the user of the body is the soul?

ALCIBIADES
Yes, the soul.

SOCRATES
And the soul rules?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally admitted.

ALCIBIADES
What is it?

SOCRATES
That man is one of three things.

ALCIBIADES
What are they?

SOCRATES
Soul, body, or both together forming a whole.

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body is man?

ALCIBIADES
Yes, we did.

SOCRATES
And does the body rule over itself?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly not.

SOCRATES
It is subject, as we were saying?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
Then that is not the principle which we are seeking?

ALCIBIADES
It would seem not.

SOCRATES
But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, and consequently that this is man?

ALCIBIADES
Very likely.

SOCRATES
The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is subject, the two united cannot possibly rule.

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is man?

ALCIBIADES
Just so.

SOCRATES
Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man?

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not; the proof is, I think, quite sufficient.

SOCRATES And if the proof, although not perfect, be sufficient, we shall be satisfied;—more precise proof will be supplied when we have discovered that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquiry would be too much protracted.

ALCIBIADES
What was that?

SOCRATES
What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be first considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps, be sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called more properly ourselves than the soul?

ALCIBIADES
There is nothing.

SOCRATES
Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with one another, soul to soul?

ALCIBIADES
Very true.

SOCRATES
And that is just what I was saying before—that I, Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul.

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul?

ALCIBIADES
That appears to be true.

SOCRATES
He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things of a man, and not the man himself?

ALCIBIADES
That is true.

SOCRATES
Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself?

ALCIBIADES
He does not.

SOCRATES
The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own belongings? When regarded in relation to the arts which they practise they are even further removed from self-knowledge, for they only know the belongings of the body, which minister to the body.

ALCIBIADES: That is true.

SOCRATES
Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his art none of them is temperate?

ALCIBIADES
I agree.

SOCRATES
And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and are not such as a good man would practise?

ALCIBIADES
Quite true.

SOCRATES
Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but what belongs to him?

ALCIBIADES
That is true.

SOCRATES
But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself?

ALCIBIADES
I agree.

SOCRATES
Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his own concerns?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
And if any one has fallen in love with the person of Alcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
But he who loves your soul is the true lover?

ALCIBIADES
That is the necessary inference.

SOCRATES
The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES: But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul follows after virtue?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when you are no longer young and the rest are gone?

ALCIBIADES
Yes, Socrates; and therein you do well, and I hope that you will remain.

SOCRATES
Then you must try to look your best.

ALCIBIADES
I will.

SOCRATES
The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades the son of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any other; and he is his darling,—Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained?

ALCIBIADES
That is true.

SOCRATES
The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas other men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And I will never desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has been ruined in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechteus is of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe the caution which I give you.

ALCIBIADES
What caution?

SOCRATES
Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote which will keep you out of harm's way.

ALCIBIADES
Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me in what way I am to take care of myself.

SOCRATES
Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as we once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of something which is not ourselves.

ALCIBIADES
That is true.

SOCRATES
And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look to that?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others?

ALCIBIADES
Very good.

SOCRATES
But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the soul?—For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking?

ALCIBIADES
What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?

SOCRATES
I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson of that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I imagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose.


ALCIBIADES
What do you mean?

SOCRATES
Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself,' as you might say to a man, 'Know thyself,' what is the nature and meaning of this precept? Would not his meaning be:—That the eye should look at that in which it would see itself?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly.

SOCRATES
And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like.

SOCRATES
Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ which is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a sort of image of the person looking?

ALCIBIADES
That is quite true.

SOCRATES
Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there see itself?

ALCIBIADES: That is evident.

SOCRATES
But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself?

ALCIBIADES
Very true.

SOCRATES
Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this?

ALCIBIADES
I agree, Socrates.

SOCRATES
And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge?

ALCIBIADES
There is none.

SOCRATES
Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will be most likely to know himself?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly.

SOCRATES
And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil?

ALCIBIADES
How can we, Socrates?

SOCRATES
You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was really his?

ALCIBIADES
It would be quite impossible.

SOCRATES
Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves?

ALCIBIADES
How could we?

SOCRATES
And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we know the belongings of our belongings?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly not.

SOCRATES
Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art.

ALCIBIADES
So much may be supposed.

SOCRATES
And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?

ALCIBIADES
Very true.

SOCRATES
And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know the affairs of states?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly not.

SOCRATES
Then such a man can never be a statesman?

ALCIBIADES
He cannot.

SOCRATES
Nor an economist?

ALCIBIADES
He cannot.

SOCRATES
He will not know what he is doing?

ALCIBIADES
He will not.

SOCRATES
And will not he who is ignorant fall into error?

ALCIBIADES
Assuredly.

SOCRATES
And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public and private capacity?

ALCIBIADES
Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES
And failing, will he not be miserable?

ALCIBIADES
Very.

SOCRATES
And what will become of those for whom he is acting?

ALCIBIADES
They will be miserable also.

SOCRATES
Then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy?

ALCIBIADES
He cannot.

SOCRATES
The bad, then, are miserable?

ALCIBIADES
Yes, very.

SOCRATES
And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is delivered from his misery?

ALCIBIADES
Clearly.

SOCRATES
Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue? (Compare Arist. Pol.)

ALCIBIADES
Indeed they do not.

SOCRATES
And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to administer their affairs rightly or nobly?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
But can a man give that which he has not?

ALCIBIADES
Impossible.

SOCRATES
Then you or any one who means to govern and superintend, not only himself and the things of himself, but the state and the things of the state, must in the first place acquire virtue.

ALCIBIADES
That is true.

SOCRATES
You have not therefore to obtain power or authority, in order to enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state, but justice and wisdom.

ALCIBIADES
Clearly.

SOCRATES
You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act according to the will of God?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright and divine, and act with a view to them?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own good?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And so you will act rightly and well?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
In which case, I will be security for your happiness.

ALCIBIADES
I accept the security.

SOCRATES
But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the dark and godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you will probably do deeds of darkness.

ALCIBIADES
Very possibly.

SOCRATES
For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he likes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either to him as an individual or to the state—for example, if he be sick and is able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician—having moreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will happen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined?

ALCIBIADES
That is true.

SOCRATES
Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will happen to him and to his fellow-sailors?

ALCIBIADES
Yes; I see that they will all perish.

SOCRATES
And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power and authority which is wanting in virtue, will not misfortune, in like manner, ensue?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Not tyrannical power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be the aim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue.

ALCIBIADES
That is true.

SOCRATES
And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is better for men as well as for children? (Compare Arist. Pol.)

ALCIBIADES
That is evident.

SOCRATES
And that which is better is also nobler?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
And what is nobler is more becoming?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly.

SOCRATES
Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better?

ALCIBIADES
True.

SOCRATES
Then vice is only suited to a slave?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And virtue to a freeman?

ALCIBIADES
Yes.

SOCRATES
And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to be avoided?

ALCIBIADES
Certainly, Socrates.

SOCRATES
And are you now conscious of your own state? And do you know whether you are a freeman or not?

ALCIBIADES
I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state.

SOCRATES
And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not even like to name to my beauty?

ALCIBIADES
Yes, I do.

SOCRATES
How?

ALCIBIADES
By your help, Socrates.

SOCRATES
That is not well said, Alcibiades.

ALCIBIADES
What ought I to have said?

SOCRATES
By the help of God.

ALCIBIADES
I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likely to be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow you as you have followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master.

SOCRATES
O that is rare! My love breeds another love: and so like the stork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched.

ALCIBIADES
Strange, but true; and henceforward I shall begin to think about justice.

SOCRATES
And I hope that you will persist; although I have fears, not because I doubt you; but I see the power of the state, which may be too much for both of us.