Petitioner attorney sought review from the recommendation of the State Bar Court (California), which recommended that petitioner be disbarred from the practice of law because of circumstances surrounding a crime involving moral turpitude and because of petitioner's conviction.

Petitioner attorney pled guilty to using a fictitious name for the purpose of conducting by means of the postal service a scheme to defraud and obtain propеrty by false pretensеs pursuant to 18 U.S.C.S. § 1342. The supreme court found this to be act of moral turpitude and placed petitioner on interim suspension. A state bar panel recommended disbarment, and the review department of the bar court confirmed. The supreme court disbarred petitioner. Petitioner had intentionally obtained credit through false credit information, including an illegally obtained driver's license, in order to finance a business scheme. Petitioner's own admissions, particularly his guilty plea, established his culpability. Petitioner was convicted of fraud, which was a principal element of moral turpitude. Petitioner's cooperation carried little weight because he only agreed to cooperate after the government dropped a number of counts. The Incorporate California fact that the crime was not committed in his professional capacity was irrelevant because moral turpitude included acts committed outside of an attorney's professional capacity. Disbarment was proper for a crime of moral turpitude.

The supreme court disbarred petitioner attorney from the practice of law after his guilty plea for mail fraud. Fraud was an element of moral turpitude, and moral turpitude was a basis for disbarment. Petitioner's responsibility for acts of moral turpitude extended beyond acts committed in his professional capacity.

In an action by respondent real estate agents to recover compensation for leasing services rendered to defendant property owners, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) vacated an order that set aside a previous judgment in favor of the agents and allowed the agents to amend their complaint to allege that the agents were licensed real estate brokers. The property owners appealed.

Upon the property owners' motion pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 473, the trial court vacated its previous judgment in favor of the agents on the basis that the agents failed to allege and prove that there were licensed real estate brokers. The agents moved to set aside that order on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The agents' attorney alleged that he was unaware of the provisions of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 10136 that he was required to allege in his complaint that the agents were licensed real estate brokers. The court held that the trial court did not err in vacating its order to set aside the judgment in the agents' favor and in allowing the agents to amend their complaint. The property owners never raised by demurrer or answer that the agents' complaint was defective for failure to allege that the agents were licensed real estate brokers. The property owners did not raise the issue at the pretrial conference or at trial.

The court affirmed the trial court's order that vacated its previous order, which had set aside the judgment in favor of the agents, and permitted the agents to amend their complaint.