The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of a disturbing incident that occurred on August 21, 2007, while I was on TDY in Iraq. I found this incident disconcerting on many fronts; however, most of all, it underscored the lack of professionalism and discipline that has been systemic during the performance of our WPPS contracts in Iraq.

As the Alternate Contracting Officer's Representative, I was sent to Iraq with the mandate of conducting a Program Management Review (PRM) of our High Threat Protection (HTP) contracts in Iraq. While conducting the PMR, I was made aware of a concerning morale and health issue surrounding one of our Dining Facilities (DFAC). More specifically, a US Army officer filed a written report citing that the DFAC was found to be substandard in four critical areas, to include poor food quality and sanitation, accompanied by a letter of unknown authorship, on embassy letterhead, requesting its closure until such a time that these issues could be satisfactorily resolved.

While investigating this claim, I contacted Mr. Daniel Carroll, the WPPS II Camp Baghdad and Task Order 6 Project Manager, and Blackwater Contractor, to inquire if he had seen the letter and to ascertain what actions, if any, had been taken to correct this issue. As neither Mr. Carroll nor the RSO Office noted any steps towards verifying the information in the original report or taking corrective measures, I reiterated that the WPPS II Camp Baghdad and DFAC in question was USG property and, accordingly, someone from the RSO's office should have been made aware of the officer's presence in the DFAC. In response to my inquiries, Mr. Carroll claimed that the WPPS II Camp Baghdad was not technically Department of State property and therefore not under Chief of Mission (COM) Authority. Mr. Carroll accentuated this point by stating that he could “kill me” at that very moment and no one could or would do anything about it as we were in Iraq. A second individual present, Mr. Donald Thomas, then made a remark that compared the lawless working environment in Iraq to the “OK corral.”

I was not only surprised by the unnerving remarks related to Mr. Carroll's perceived understanding of what fell under COM Authority and Department property, but also by the cavalier and unrestrained manner in which the Blackwater contractors felt they could respond to a USG official. To me, it was immediately apparent that the Blackwater contractors believed that they were the de facto authority and acted accordingly, in an alarming manner.

In addition, I witnessed Blackwater contractors make disparaging remarks of superiority in reference to the FBI personnel presence in Iraq. These comments along with my COM Authority conversation sent a clear message that the Blackwater contractors saw themselves as “above the law” and actually believed that they “ran the place.” Once again, this highlights conduct and performance issues that have been present throughout Blackwater's participation in the WPPS program.

As recent Congressional inquiries have focused on our WPPS contracts and our contractors in Iraq, it has underscored that the management of these contracts remotely from the headquarters level has not been successful. This “hands off” management style from Washington, D.C., to include the signing of invoices without a clear understanding of services rendered on the ground, has served to create an atmosphere where the contractors, instead of Department officials, are in command and in control.

During and after my stay in Iraq, it has become fully apparent to me that the management structures in place to manage and monitor our WPPS contracts in Iraq have become subservient to the contractor themselves. This occurrence has resulted in a situation where the oversight of these high profile and extremely lucrative contracts is merely superficial at best. To correct this unraveling situation and right its course, it is my assessment that direct oversight of the contractor, including an assigned Contracting Officer's Representative, is immediately required on the ground in Iraq. Accordingly, this in-country management oversight should be multi-layered and provide a constant management presence focused on contract compliance and performance. Our current structure of managing these contracts remotely from a headquarters level has proven itself to be ineffective, thus creating an environment full of liability and negligence.